Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice by Huq, Aziz
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2019
Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice
Aziz Huq
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aziz Huq, "Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice," 68 Duke Law Journal 1043 (2019).
HUQ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019 3:10 PM 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 68 MARCH 2019 NUMBER 6 
 
RACIAL EQUITY IN ALGORITHMIC 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AZIZ Z. HUQ† 
ABSTRACT 
  Algorithmic tools for predicting violence and criminality are 
increasingly deployed in policing, bail, and sentencing. Scholarly 
attention to date has focused on these tools’ procedural due process 
implications. This Article considers their interaction with the enduring 
racial dimensions of the criminal justice system. I consider two 
alternative lenses for evaluating the racial effects of algorithmic 
criminal justice: constitutional doctrine and emerging technical 
standards of “algorithmic fairness.” I argue first that constitutional 
doctrine is poorly suited to the task. It often fails to capture the full 
spectrum of racial issues that can arise in the use of algorithmic tools in 
criminal justice. Emerging technical standards of algorithmic fairness 
are at least attentive to the specifics of the relevant technology. But the 
technical literature has failed to grapple with how, or whether, various 
technical conceptions of fairness track policy-significant consequences. 
Drawing on the technical literature, I propose a reformulated metric 
for considering racial equity concerns in algorithmic design: Rather 
than asking about abstract definitions of fairness, a criminal justice 
algorithm should be evaluated in terms of its long-term, dynamic effects 
on racial stratification. The metric of nondiscrimination for an 
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algorithmically assigned form of state coercion should focus on the net 
burden thereby placed on a racial minority.  
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INTRODUCTION 
From the cotton gin to the camera phone, new technologies have 
scrambled, invigorated, and refashioned the terms on which the state 
coerces. Today, we are in the throes of another major reconfiguration. 
Police, courts, and parole boards across the country are turning to 
sophisticated algorithmic instruments to guide decisions about the 
where, whom, and when of law enforcement.1 New predictive 
algorithms trawl immense quantities of data, exploit massive 
computational power, and leverage new machine-learning 
technologies to generate predictions no human could conjure. These 
tools are likely to have enduring effects on the criminal justice system. 
Yet law remains far behind in thinking through the difficult questions 
that arise when machine learning substitutes for human discretion. 
My aim in this Article is to isolate one important design margin 
for evaluating algorithmic criminal justice: the effect of algorithmic 
criminal justice tools on racial equity. I use this capacious term to 
capture the complex ways in which the state’s use of a technology can 
implicate normative and legal concerns related to racial dynamics. The 
Article considers a number of ways in which legal scholars and 
computer scientists have theorized how criminal justice interacts with 
racial patterning in practice. It analyzes the utility of each lens for 
evaluating new algorithmic technologies. A primary lesson concerns 
the parameter that best captures racial equity concerns in an 
algorithmic setting: I suggest that the leading metrics advanced by 
computer scientists are not sufficient, and propose an alternative. A 
secondary lesson relates to the fit between problems of race in the 
algorithmic context on the one hand, and legal or technical conceptions 
of equality on the other. Reflection on technological change, that is, 
casts light on the approaching desuetude of equal protection doctrine. 
Racial equity merits a discrete, detailed inquiry given the fraught 
racial history of American criminal justice institutions.2 Since the turn 
of the twentieth century, public arguments about criminality have been 
entangled, often invidiously, with generalizations about race and the 
putative criminality of racial minorities.3 Today, pigmentation 
 
 1. Reed E. Hundt, Making No Secrets About It, 10 ISJLP 581, 588 (2014) (“[The 
G]overnment now routinely asks computers to suggest who has committed crimes.”). 
 2. This is a familiar thought. Matthew Desmond & Mustafa Emirbayr, To Imagine and 
Pursue Racial Justice, 15 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 259, 268 (2012) (“One of the most racially 
unjust institutions today in American society is the American criminal justice system.”). 
 3. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: 
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regrettably remains for many people a de facto proxy for criminality. 
That proxy distorts everything from residential patterns to labor 
market opportunities.4 Police respond to black and white suspects in 
different ways.5 So do judges and prosecutors.6 Partly as a result of 
these dynamics, roughly one in three black men (and one in five Latino 
men) will be incarcerated during their lifetime.7 At the same time, the 
criminal justice system imposes substantial socioeconomic costs on 
minority citizens not directly touched by policing or prosecutions. In 
particular, minority children of the incarcerated bear an 
unconscionable burden as a result of separation from their parents.8 
More generally, there is substantial evidence that spillover costs of 
producing public safety fall disproportionately on minority groups.9 As 
 
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (exploring how at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, policymakers in northern cities began linking crime to African 
Americans on the basis of genetic and predispositional arguments). 
 4. See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of 
Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718 (2001) (finding 
“that the percentage of a neighborhood’s black population, particularly . . . young black men, is 
significantly associated with perceptions of the severity of the neighborhood’s crime problem”); 
Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the 
Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319–23 (2004) (finding that 
perceptions of disorder in a neighborhood were better predicted by the racial composition of a 
neighborhood than by actual disorder). 
 5. For evidence, see CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-
MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32–33 (2014) 
(describing the use of racial profiling in drug arrests); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of 
Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
2397, 2407–13 (2017) [hereinafter Huq, Disparate Policing] (discussing evidence of such 
disparities in police stop-and-frisks). 
 6. For two different perspectives, emphasizing intentional bias and disparate racial impacts, 
see Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s Prison 
and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 265 (2009) (finding that “seemingly legitimate 
sentencing factors such as criminal history scoring can have strongly disparate impacts on 
nonwhite defendants”); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial 
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 25–30 
(2013) (documenting racial disparities in federal prosecutorial charging decisions related to the 
application of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases). 
 7. See Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49, 55 (2015) (noting that in 2001 “the chances of ever going to prison 
were highest among black males (32.2 percent) and Hispanic males (17.2 percent)”); see also 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 31–39 (2006) (describing the 
growth of the incarcerated population over time and describing racial inequalities). 
 8. See SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON BOOM: 
MASS INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 41 (2014) (discussing the 
racially disparate spillover effects of paternal and maternal incarceration on children). 
 9. See id. (noting the disproportionate number of minority children in foster care, for 
instance).  
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a result, criminal justice elicits racial stratification.10 Such downstream 
consequences of existing criminal justice institutions raise weighty 
moral and legal questions.11 Even if one demurs to the analogy 
commonly drawn between our criminal justice system and early 
twentieth-century debt peonage,12 it is clear that the criminal justice 
system is an institution in which racial identity has meaningful effects 
and that these in turn have influences on the role that race plays in 
larger American society.13 In crude terms, it can be both racist and race 
making. 
To sharpen this point, it is useful to have at hand two examples of 
how new technologies can prompt debates about racial equity. I 
present the first at greater length because it has become a focal point 
in public debates. First, the Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) software 
application, created by the Northpointe Institution for Public 
Management, is used across the country to inform bail and parole 
decisions. COMPAS is organized around an algorithm that uses the 
answers to some 137 questions about a criminal suspect to rank them 
on a scale of 1 to 10.14 This scale is supposed to capture the suspect’s 
risk of reoffending and violent recidivism, with higher scores indicating 
a greater risk of recidivism. In 2016, journalists from the ProPublica 
organization did a quantitative analysis of COMPAS scores for roughly 
ten thousand people arrested and evaluated in Broward County, 
 
 10. For a synoptic view of this claim that is dated, but still insightful, see generally RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).  
 11. I think it is important for legal scholars to be candid in distinguishing their normative 
judgments from their analytic, doctrinal, and empirical claims. The following paragraph states my 
normative position; it is a premise of what follows, not a conclusion I seek to defend here. See 
infra Part III.A (further defending this position). 
 12. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (comparing the modern criminal justice system to the Jim 
Crow South). For nuanced criticism of Alexander’s paradigm, see James Forman, Jr., Racial 
Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 42–43 (2012).  
 13. See James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 122 (2009) (describing the various stages of the criminal justice system 
through which minorities face discriminatory treatment).  
 14. Ed Young, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equivant-
compas-algorithm/550646 [https://perma.cc/NY69-DF3L]. COMPAS stands for Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions. For descriptions of the COMPAS 
algorithm, see EQUIVANT, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1–2 (2017), 
http://www.equivant.com/assets/img/content/Practitioners_Guide_COMPASCore_121917.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ML8-NC9U]; see also In re Hawthorne v. Stanford, 22 N.Y.S. 3d 640, 641–42 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (describing the COMPAS assessment tool). 
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Florida. By comparing COMPAS scores to a person’s behavior in the 
two years after bail was granted, ProPublica was able to evaluate the 
instrument’s accuracy and, in particular, to investigate whether it had 
differential effects on different racial groups.  
ProPublica estimated that the COMPAS instrument correctly 
predicted recidivism rates 61 percent of the time and violent recidivism 
rates 20 percent of the time.15 ProPublica also concluded that the 
algorithm “was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as 
future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the 
rate as white defendants.”16 To reach this conclusion, ProPublica 
isolated the group of black suspects who had not reoffended in the two 
years following their evaluation. It found that 45 percent of that group 
was labeled high risk by the algorithm.17 ProPublica then looked at the 
group of white suspects who had not reoffended and found that only 
23 percent of that group had been labeled high risk. In other words, the 
ratio of false positives to true negatives within the pool of defendants 
who did not go on to recidivate was higher for blacks than for whites.18 
Correspondingly, ProPublica also found that the ratio of false 
negatives to true positives was lower for whites than for blacks.19 
Not surprisingly, the company responded by sharply contesting 
ProPublica’s analysis. Northpointe data scientists insisted that 
COMPAS was well calibrated in the sense that white and black 
defendants assigned the same risk score were equally likely to 
recidivate.20 This constituted evidence, the company argued, that 
 
 15. Jeff Larsen, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner & Julia Angwin, How We Analyzed the 
COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/YS62-AXYX]. Note 
that rates of violent crime tend to be so low that an “accurate” instrument would be one that 
simply classified everyone as low risk. 
 16. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias: There’s 
Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/6L7T-ELPG]. ProPublica treated “medium” and “high” 
risk rankings as higher risk.  
 17. Larsen et al., supra note 15. This disparity remained once ProPublica controlled for 
“prior crimes, future recidivism, age, and gender.” Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. See WILLIAM DIETERICH, CHRISTINA MENDOZA & TIM BRENNAN, NORTHPOINTE INC. 
RESEARCH DEPT., COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND 
PREDICTIVE PARITY 3 (2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391/ProPublica-
Commentary-Final-070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGR7-TJPV] (flagging “equal discriminative 
ability” of the algorithm for blacks and whites); see also Anthony W. Flores, Kristin Bechtel & 
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to 
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where it mattered to the imposition of state coercion (i.e., where there 
was a prediction of high risk), the COMPAS algorithm had equal error 
rates across groups. In addition, Northpointe made a number of 
(sharply contested) technical complaints about ProPublica’s analysis 
related to the way it accounted for base recidivism rates and how it cut 
its sample between low- and high-risk defendants.21 These complaints 
lacked the force of Northpointe’s central claim—that its risk 
predictions were equally accurate where it counted, regardless of race. 
This dialogue was not the end of the matter. Other analysts raised a 
cautionary flag to warn against accepting the terms of the debate as 
framed by ProPublica and Northpointe: Something more complex, 
they worried, seemed at stake, although they did not explain fully how 
to resolve these problems.22 As a result, the debate about COMPAS—
and in particular the question of which measure of fairness should be 
used to evaluate a predictive algorithm—persists as a locus for 
normative concern. 
A second example of the race-related questions potentially raised 
by algorithmic criminal justice arises in the policing context, where 
officers are increasingly using such tools in determining where to 
deploy and whom to apprehend.23 In Chicago, police faced with a wave 
of deadly street violence24 have deployed a “Strategic Subjects List,” or 
 
“Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s 
Biased Against Blacks.,” 80 FED. PROBATION 38, 38 (2016) (describing the ProPublica analysis as 
“faulty”). For a different result using a reconstruction of the COMPAS algorithm, see Razieh 
Nabi & Ilya Shpitser, Fair Inference on Outcomes, in THE THIRTY-SECOND AAAI CONFERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1931, 1938 (2018), https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ 
AAAI/AAAI18/paper/download/16683/15898 [https://perma.cc/FW6V-XZ5E]. 
 21. See DIETERICH, MENDOZA & BRENNAN, supra note 20, at 32–33.  
 22. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer 
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually 
Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-
propublicas/?utm_term=.f8164ea2cd2c [https://perma.cc/63EU-HSMZ]; Matthias Spielkamp, 
Inspecting Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607955/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias [https://perma.cc/ 
W3QW-XNW3]. For my analysis of the COMPAS algorithm, see infra notes 335–38 and 
accompanying text. 
 23. Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime Before It Happens?, SCIENCE 
(Sept. 28, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-
prevent-crime-it-happens [https://perma.cc/L7BZ-46M3] (noting the adoption of policing tools 
“which incorporate everything from minor crime reports to criminals’ Facebook profiles”); see 
also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1120–44 
(2017) (providing a careful catalogue of predictive policing tools).  
 24. Monica Davey, Chicago Tactics Put Major Dent in Killing Trend, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/us/chicago-homicides-fall-by-34-percent-so-far-this-
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SSL. This is an algorithm developed by data scientists at the Illinois 
Institute of Technology using U.S. Department of Justice funds.25 The 
SSL ranks individuals known to police for the risk of involvement in a 
shooting using eight data points.26 Its aim, according to the Chief of 
Organizational Development for the department, was “to figure out 
now . . . how does that data inform what happens in the future.”27 Yet 
despite the fact that the SSL algorithm explicitly accounted for neither 
race nor gender,28 interventions based on SSL were quickly condemned 
for directing disproportionate attention to African American men.29 
Other algorithms that guide the allocation of policing resources on 
geographic rather than individual terms have elicited kindred concerns 
about racial targeting.30 
Questions about algorithmic criminal justice are poised to become 
more complex. COMPAS and the SSL are both relatively 
straightforward instruments. Each applies a fixed regression equation 
with a limited array of parameters to a static data set. Advances in what 
is called machine learning, however, will soon render this sort of tool 
passé. Machine learning is a “general purpose technology”31 that, in 
broad terms, encompasses “algorithms and systems that improve their 
 
year.html [https://perma.cc/ZC7R-M2MH]. 
 25. City of Chicago, Strategic Subject List: Public Safety, CHI DATA PORTAL, 
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Strategic-Subject-List/4aki-r3np [https://perma.cc/ 
VYQ6-3FKS]. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ As Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. 
TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-
20130821_1_ chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list [https://perma.cc/R3DR-
GKAP]. 
 28. City of Chicago, supra note 25. Other predictive policing instruments, however, do 
explicitly account for suspects’ race. DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, STUCK IN 
A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON “PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3–5 (2016), 
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_ 
Pattern_v.1.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXS-2A76].  
 29. See, e.g., Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts 
Crimes, But Is It Racist?, THE VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-
but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/JK3Y-5HMG]. 
 30. Justin Jouvenal, Police Are Using Software to Predict Crime. Is It a ‘Holy Grail’ or Biased 
Against Minorities?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/police-are-using-software-to-predict-crime-is-it-a-holy-grail-or-biased-against-minorities/ 
2016/11/17/525a6649-0472-440a-aae1-b283aa8e5de8_story.html?utm_term=.72a9d2eb22ae 
[https://perma.cc/MZ5W-GCTS]. 
 31. Erik Brynjolfsson & Tom Mitchell, What Can Machine Learning Do? Workforce 
Implications, 358 SCIENCE 1530, 1530 (2017). 
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knowledge or performance with experience.”32 So, a standard 
supervised machine-learning instrument—the species of machine 
learning likely most relevant in the criminal justice space33—begins 
with a so-called training set of examples that are “labeled” with some 
parameter values. The algorithm examines relations between various 
parameters associated with those examples to develop a wholly new 
criterion to classify new examples.34 Unlike more familiar econometric 
tools such as regression analysis, a supervised machine-learning 
process classifies on the basis of rules that the algorithm itself has 
developed. Refining this process, the subset of machine-learning tools 
called “deep learning” deploy multilayered processes, account for 
billions of data points, and constantly adjust their classification rule.35 
Machine learning is now being deployed, for instance, in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, to predict house burglaries,36 and in Durham, England, 
to predict individual recidivism.37 Deep learning is used in facial 
recognition and machine translation; it will likely find new uses as its 
capabilities are better understood. My use of the term “algorithmic 
criminal justice” is intended to capture both existing instruments, such 
as COMPAS and the SSL, and also machine-learning (including deep-
learning) tools that are likely to be deployed for prediction purposes in 
the future. Such synoptic consideration is warranted because all of 
 
 32. PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT 
MAKE SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012); ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 2 
(3d ed. 2014); see also infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text (providing a fuller account of 
machine learning); infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing deep learning). 
 33. See Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, 355 SCIENCE 
483 (2017) (noting the use of structured machine learning to solve prediction problems). 
 34. COMM. ON THE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE DATA ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., FRONTIERS IN MASSIVE DATA ANALYSIS 104 (2013) (noting that in 
supervised learning, the analyst must actively specify a variable of interest); Athey, supra note 33, 
at 483 (explaining that machine-learning “programs take as input training data sets and estimate 
or ‘learn’ parameters that can be used to make predictions on new data”); M. I. Jordan & T. M. 
Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and Prospects, 349 SCIENCE 255, 257 (2015) 
(defining supervised learning as a process in which “the training data take the form of a collection 
of (x, y) pairs and the goal is to produce a prediction y* in response to a query x*”). 
 35. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 34, at 257. Deep learning uses a process called stochastic 
gradient descent to improve predictive quality continuously. Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & 
Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 437 (2015).  
 36. Cynthia Rudin, Predictive Policing: Using Machine Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, 
WIRED (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/predictive-policing-using-
machine-learning-to-detect-patterns-of-crime [https://perma.cc/4U26-3BB9].  
 37. Chris Baraniuk, Durham Police AI to Help with Custody Decisions, BBC NEWS (May 10, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39857645 [https://perma.cc/26MV-F4ST]. See infra 
Part I.C for a catalog of more examples of how machine learning is used in the criminal justice 
context.  
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these tools leverage historical data to generate predictions for new, 
out-of-sample data.38 
Algorithmic tools in criminal justice are worth isolating for a 
careful legal analysis for a number of reasons. They are likely to soon 
become pervasive. They are also that rare instrumentality of state 
power in respect to which normative intuitions remain inchoate and 
hence malleable. They represent a qualitative change from the crude 
evaluative tools embodied in present bail and sentencing practices. 
These build on imprecise measures of recidivism risk, fail to account 
for immediate or downstream costs, and cannot be calibrated with the 
precision of emerging tools. The precision enabled by the algorithmic 
turn pries open a substantively new domain of policy-design 
possibilities. Finally, an analysis of algorithmic tools has more general 
lessons for our equal protection jurisprudence—or at least so I shall 
argue. 
Two distinct analytic frameworks in use now could be used to 
evaluate the racial effects of machine-learning tools in criminal justice. 
The first derives from constitutional law. The second is found in the 
computer science literature on algorithm design.39 Neither, in my view, 
is up to the task. The constitutional law of racial inequality directs 
attention to trivial or irrelevant design margins; it is at times 
counterproductive. In contrast, technical discussions of algorithmic 
fairness have yielded a dazzling array of parameters that capture 
different elements of an algorithm’s operation. But as the debate 
between ProPublica and Northpointe shows, the computer science 
literature has generated no clear consensus about which parameter 
matters. This Article fills the gap left by the irrelevance of 
constitutional law and the undertheorization of computer science. It 
offers a novel, normatively grounded, and empirically pertinent 
framework for thinking about racial equity in this emerging 
technological context.40 
 
 38. I use the term prediction not because all of these instruments aim at the future. Rather, 
the term captures the possibility that one data set will be used to generate an instrument for 
drawing inferences about a different sample of data. It is a prediction in the sense of being an out-
of-sample estimate. 
 39. I will not work through all of the relevant computer science literature here. For a brief 
survey that touches on some of the questions analyzed here, see Joshua A. Kroll et al., 
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682–90 (2017).  
 40. To the extent that algorithmic tools are more generally replacing diffuse human 
discretion, my reconceptualization of equality norms may have more general application.  
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Consider first the current constitutional framework for the 
regulation of race effects in policing. The doctrine, in rough 
paraphrase, has two main prongs. One concern in the jurisprudence 
turns on the use of “racial stereotypes or animus” held by individual 
actors.41 A focus on animus or stereotypes, though, doesn’t easily 
translate into contexts in which an algorithm blends data streams to 
estimate unknown parameter values. At best, a concern with intent 
captures a subset of deeply problematic cases in which data inputs are 
tainted. Worse, while these cases are likely to be common in practice, 
it is not clear that contemporary doctrine is up to the task of flagging 
them. Second, equal protection doctrine is also concerned with the use 
of racial classifications. But in the emergent context of algorithmic 
criminal justice, where decision rules are computed endogenously from 
historical data and then applied without being broadcast to the public, 
the expressive or distortive harms of racial classifications may well not 
be present. An algorithm’s use of racial data is unlikely to stigmatize 
or otherwise impose any harm putatively linked to the use of suspect 
classifications. Eliminating such criteria, moreover, can leave actual 
outcomes unchanged. Worse, it can generate needless public safety–
related costs. This is because algorithmic use of a proscribed criterion, 
such as race, might in some instances improve the quality of 
predictions. Thinking about equal protection jurisprudence in relation 
to algorithmic criminal justice therefore suggests that the former is not 
a coherent or morally acute metric. This mismatch is likely to have 
wider significance as algorithms are increasingly substituted for human 
judgment in criminal justice and beyond. 
If constitutional law provides no creditable guidance, what of the 
burgeoning computer science scholarship on “algorithmic fairness” 
and “algorithmic discrimination,” terms to date used to cover a number 
of different means of evaluating predictive tools?42 At a very high level 
of abstraction, the technical literature usefully distinguishes between 
two different ways in which race effects might emerge in algorithmic 
criminal justice. The first is the use of racially tainted historical data to 
build an algorithm. For example, a policing algorithm used to predict 
who will be involved in crime, such as the SSL, might employ data 
 
 41. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); see also Aziz Z. Huq, What is 
Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225–31 (2018) [hereinafter Huq, 
Discriminatory Intent] (analyzing the central role of intent in the context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
 42. For a survey of the relevant work, see infra Part II.  
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gathered by police, such as records of past street stops or past arrests. 
If the pattern of this historical policing activity is informed by racial 
considerations, then the algorithm’s predictions will be accordingly 
skewed. Fixing this first problem of polluted training data is 
straightforward in theory but often quite difficult in practice. As 
several legal scholars have noted, algorithms can in theory always be 
constructed without tainted training data.43 Whatever considerable 
difficulties this might present in terms of implementation, it raises no 
great theoretical impediment. 
But the second way in which a racial problem can arise from the 
use of algorithmic tools does present a theoretical obstacle.44 It turns 
on the possibility that an algorithm will generate patterns of error that 
are systematically skewed between racial groups. As the debate 
between ProPublica and Northpointe illustrates, however, there is 
more than one way of measuring errors and more than one way of 
thinking about racial skewing. Indeed, the computer science literature 
has generated a plethora of possible metrics. Simplifying this literature 
by stripping away redundant and irrelevant conceptual trappings, I 
suggest that an analysis of racial equity might focus on one of four 
different parameters. 
First, one might simply look at whether equal fractions of each 
racial group are labeled as risky, such that they will be subject to 
additional policing or detention. Where risk is measured as a 
continuous variable, this would mean looking at whether the average 
risk scores of different racial groups varied. Second, one might ask 
whether the same classification rule is being used to assign racial 
groups to the high-risk category. This condition is satisfied if the same 
numerical risk score is used as a cutoff for all groups. Third, one might 
separate each racial group and then look at the rate of false positives 
conditional on being categorized as high risk. This is the parameter that 
Northpointe stressed. And fourth, one might separate each racial 
group and ask how frequently false positives are conditional on being 
 
 43. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017) 
(suggesting that algorithmic discrimination may be addressed with more transparency about 
inputs and outputs); Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-
white-guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/HJ2D-TUG4]; Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 680 
(“[A]lgorithms that include some type of machine learning can lead to discriminatory results if 
the algorithms are trained on historical examples that reflect past prejudice or implicit bias . . . .”).  
 44. Accountable Algorithms recognizes that “machine learning models can build in 
discrimination through choices in how models are constructed.” Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 681. 
This is not, however, the central focus of their wide-ranging and useful analysis.  
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in fact a low-risk person. This is the parameter ProPublica 
underscored. 
Each of these metrics tracks a subtly different conception of 
nondiscrimination. So which fits best a normatively relevant 
conception of racial equity? The question is complicated by two 
considerations. First, there is an irreconcilable tension in practice 
between the first and second criteria. If the average risk score of two 
racial groups diverge, it is not possible to use the same classification 
rule and also to ensure that an equal fraction of each group is 
categorized as high risk. That is, the same risk threshold applied to 
different populations yields different results. Second, computer science 
scholars (in collaboration with legal scholars, including myself) have 
developed in the past two years an impossibility result concerning the 
third and fourth metrics. Under most empirically plausible conditions, 
a risk instrument cannot satisfy both the third and the fourth criterion. 
That is, if the proportion of false positives as a fraction of all positives 
is equalized between races, then the ratio of low-risk individuals 
subject to coercion will diverge between the two groups. There is hence 
an irreconcilable tension (in many feasible states of the world) between 
having equally accurate predictions of high risk and equalizing the 
rates of false positives within the pool of nonrecidivist suspects. 
To prioritize between these conceptions of racial equity, it is 
necessary to give an account of the normative stakes of racial equity in 
criminal law. In the ordinary course, we might look to constitutional 
law to this end. But we have already seen that constitutional law does 
not provide a fit or tractable frame for analysis. I thus return to first 
principles. In my view, the primary reason for concern with racial 
equity in the algorithmic criminal justice context is that efforts to 
suppress crime entrench wider social patterns of racial stratification. In 
important part, stratification effects arise because of the asymmetrical 
spillovers from criminal justice for minority but not majority 
populations. A parameter for measuring racial equity, therefore, 
should track this causal effect of criminal justice on racial stratification. 
An algorithm that recommends coercion for a member of the 
subordinated racial group at the margin when it is not justified in terms 
of benefits to that racial group will likely increase racial stratification. 
When coercion of the marginal minority group member is unjustified, 
it imposes a net burden on the minority group, thus compounding 
social stratification. Further, if the majority group does not benefit 
from the policy, or if its net gain is less than the costs imposed on the 
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minority group, that policy is also socially inefficient.45 I suspect that 
governments often overestimate the crime suppression benefits of 
coercive actions while underestimating their costs. Racial equity is 
therefore served in the first instance today by ratcheting coercion down 
to socially optimal levels46 and then by selecting for criminal justice 
tools that do not burden minority groups. 
In designing an algorithm, this intuition must be translated into 
instructions for the classification protocol. As a rough first cut, this 
might be done differently for serious and less serious crimes. For 
serious violent and property crimes, the most important costs and 
benefits of crime (and crime prevention) accrue directly to the 
perpetrator and the victim. Spillovers are small by comparison. In these 
conditions, a single, socially optimal classification rule will advance 
racial equity and satisfy an efficiency criterion. Rates of false positives, 
underscored by ProPublica and Northpointe, are less relevant. For less 
serious crimes and misdemeanors, however, empirical studies identify 
large spillover costs asymmetrically imposed on minority but not 
majority communities. At the margin, these spillovers mean that 
coercion of the minority is both less likely to be efficient and more 
likely to generate racial stratification. Accordingly, a bifurcated 
classification rule using different risk thresholds for differently 
stratified racial groups is appropriate to account for asymmetrical 
spillovers. 
Plural risk thresholds may be socially efficient and racially just, but 
they confront practical and legal hurdles. First, evaluating algorithmic 
tools in light of social externalities will require much more information 
about downstream costs than is presently available. Governments have 
been woefully deficient in collecting such data; existing risk assessment 
instruments embody information about recidivism risk but include 
neither the direct nor the indirect costs of criminal justice coercion.47 
 
 45. Only if the gains to a majority group exceed the costs to a minority group is there a 
tension between efficiency and racial equity. As I explain below, I think it is plausible to prioritize 
equality norms in many of these conflicts.  
 46. In using the term “social efficiency,” I mean to capture a static (and in my view naïve) 
account of welfare that looks only to proximate costs and benefits. It is my view that racial 
stratification is plausibly described as an “inefficient” equilibrium to the extent that it dissipates 
large amounts of human capital while inflicting onerous psychological and stigmatic burdens. But 
since my view is not orthodox, I do not insist on it here and instead use “efficiency” in its more 
common sense.  
 47. See Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 583 (2018) (proposing certain guiding principles for better risk 
assessment but not touching on the issue of coercion).  
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This is a large epistemic void that scholars can fill. It is at least possible 
that other big-data tools will be important in this regard. Second, the 
use of racially bifurcated thresholds would raise constitutional 
concerns akin to those engendered by affirmative action programs. But 
to the extent current doctrine mandates an outcome that is both 
socially inefficient and also racially iniquitous, it is the doctrine that is 
indefensible. 
Some limitations on my analysis in this Article should be flagged 
up front. First, I should again underscore that the costs and benefits of 
algorithmic tools vary depending on where in the criminal justice 
process they are deployed. My aim here is to set out a general 
framework; it is not to pass judgment on any particular computational 
tool. Second, this Article does not address the integration of 
algorithmic outputs into individualized suspicion determinations under 
the Fourth Amendment48 or the issues related to procedural due 
process rights from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.49 These 
constitutional rules engage different elements of algorithm design. For 
example, an important recent article develops a concept of “procedural 
regularity” to ensure that algorithmic decisions are “made using 
consistently applied standards and practices.”50 This is a meaningful 
concern. But it is distinct from racial equity. I also do not address the 
statutory standard supplied by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
This has been a topic in other valuable recent work on algorithmic 
 
 48. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of 
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2017) (arguing that for predictions to be used 
as a basis for searches under the Fourth Amendment, they have to be “intelligible,” in the sense 
of being amenable to explanation); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive 
Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 383–84 (2015); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, 
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 929 (2016) 
(developing a “framework” for integrating machine-learning technologies into Fourth 
Amendment analysis). Judicial consideration of this issue has been limited. Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 709 S.E.2d 139, 143 (Va. 2011) (relying on constructive knowledge doctrine to allow 
officer use of a predictive algorithm in a Terry stop). 
 49. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256–57 
(2008) (criticizing the “crudeness” of then-extant algorithms).  
 50. Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 637–38; see Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and 
Due Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 
(2014) (arguing for “procedural data due process [to] regulate the fairness of Big Data’s analytical 
processes with regard to how they use personal data . . . in any adjudicative process”). 
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justice.51 Nor do I address algorithms’ use outside the criminal justice 
context.52 
Finally, my conclusions diverge from those of one prominent 
article that examines the racial effects of a larger class of “evidence-
based” predictive instruments and condemns those instruments in 
gross. It argues that they elicit “overt discrimination based on 
demographics and socioeconomic status.”53 Its legal analysis is 
premised on the dubious proposition that “[c]urrent” constitutional 
law “calls into serious question the variables related to socioeconomic 
status, such as employment status, education, income, dependence on 
government assistance, and job skills.”54 I am not convinced this is an 
accurate statement of current law. My analysis thus proceeds on the 
basis of different doctrinal predicates. Moreover, the earlier article 
does not explicate carefully both the costs and benefits of algorithmic 
criminal justice.55 A more meticulous approach is needed that 
disaggregates possible technological approaches and normative effects. 
 
 51. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
671, 694 (2016) (examining “[l]iability under Title VII for discriminatory data mining [which] will 
depend on the particular mechanism by which the inequitable outcomes are generated”); see also 
Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 692–95 (“Algorithmic decisionmaking blurs the definitions of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact [under Title VII] and poses a number of open 
questions.”). 
 52. In addition, there is a small body of insightful popular literature about the distributive 
effects of algorithmic instruments more generally. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, 
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE 
POOR (2018) (discussing the impact of automated systems on poor people in America); CATHY 
O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 203–06 (2016) (decrying the regressive tendencies of big-data 
technologies generally).  
 53. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014). One other article contains the assertion that “if 
racial and ethnic variables significantly improved the predictive validity of risk-needs models, 
then including them would appear to be narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling 
interests.” Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 259 (2015). Hamilton equates narrow tailoring with minimal efficacy. She 
fails to meaningfully grapple with existing precedent. And she is opaque as to what kind of racial 
effects might have legal or normative significance. Her analysis is thus quite limited. Finally, a 
brief 2016 article suggests that the application of certain algorithmic tools in a sentencing context 
might violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Gregory Cui, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Taint 
of Dangerousness, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 315, 317 (2016).  
 54. Starr, supra note 53, at 830. Starr also argues that evidence-based methods do worse in 
sheer accuracy terms than readily available alternatives such as clinical assessments. Id. at 842–
62. This is also orthogonal to my analysis here.  
 55. Starr notes that “[t]here appears to be a general consensus that using race would be 
unconstitutional,” id. at 812, but this assertion is not based on a comprehensive appreciation of 
the ways in which racial effects might be embedded in, or emerge from, algorithmic instruments. 
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The Article unfolds in three steps. Part I defines algorithmic 
criminal justice and illustrates it by isolating discrete clusters of related 
instruments now employed in criminal justice or likely soon to be used. 
I also supply nontechnical exposition of the relevant technologies. Part 
II explores the legal criteria of racial equity with special attention to 
the Equal Protection Clause. It identifies deficiencies in that 
framework as it applies to algorithmic criminal justice. Part III then 
turns to the nascent computer science literature on technical standards 
of fairness for algorithmic criminal justice. I begin by articulating a 
normative account of racial equity concerns in criminal justice. I then 
work through the various metrics identified in the literature to measure 
racial equity, as well as the tensions between those metrics. Finally, I 
set forth my own account of racial equity and explain how it can be 
operationalized—both in theory and in practice. 
I.  ALGORITHMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SCOPE AND OPERATION 
Predictive criminal justice was old when Captain Renault told his 
men in Casablanca to “round up the usual suspects.”56 The meaningful 
use of “criminal justice determinations that do not rest simply on 
probabilities but on statistical correlations between group traits and 
group criminal offending rates” can be traced back to the beginning of 
the twentieth century.57 The resulting profusion of predictive 
instruments extends well beyond the algorithmic criminal justice 
instruments to be considered here. For example, an array of evidence-
based interventions from interviews to actuarial scoring have long been 
employed in the sentencing context.58 
 
 56. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) 
(“[P]rediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered 
throughout our criminal justice system.”).  
 57. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 18 (2007). Prediction has become an entrenched part of 
criminal justice: 
Criminal justice actors often predict which defendants are going to commit an 
additional crime in determining whether to arrest defendants, to release them on bail, 
or to release them on parole, or in determining their sentence. This prediction is often 
based not only on individual evaluation, but also on a group’s criminality and past 
behavior. 
Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 176–77 (2013). 
See also Richard Berk, Forecasting Methods in Crime and Justice, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 219, 
221–23 (2008) (setting out the history of formal crime prediction models).  
 58. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 537, 539 (2015) (discussing “the use of actuarial risk and need assessment 
instruments, motivational interviewing and counseling techniques, deterrence-based sanction 
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To sharpen the ensuing analysis, it is useful to define with some 
precision a discrete domain of practices as “algorithmic criminal 
justice.” This Part offers such a definition and then fleshes out that 
concept with a series of examples from the policing, bail, and post-
conviction (parole and probation) contexts. Where salient, I offer 
capsule accounts of relevant technologies central to my analysis. 
A. A Definition of Algorithmic Criminal Justice 
Algorithmic criminal justice, as I define the term, is the application 
of an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify new 
subjects in terms of the probability of expected criminal activity and in 
relation to the application of state coercion. This definition has three 
elements. Once explicated, those elements provide a justification for 
treating this domain as a distinct object of legal and normative inquiry. 
First, my definition requires an automated protocol, or algorithm, 
that routinizes a decision—here, about state coercion.59 In contrast to 
such a structured decision-making context, American criminal justice 
is replete with instances in which officials such as police officers, 
sentencing judges, parole boards, or probation officers exercise 
partially structured discretion to determine the legality of coercing a 
particular person. Even where a written protocol is used, as in the 
sentencing context, substantial residual discretion remains.60 In a larger 
domain of cases, though, criminal justice actors are unbounded by 
either protocol or clear rules. For example, the Fourth Amendment 
imposes thresholds of reasonable “articulable suspicion” for certain 
street stops,61 and “probable cause” for certain arrests.62 The Supreme 
Court has resisted efforts to formalize these concepts into “technical”63 
 
programs, and incentives to probationers and parolees for successful compliance with court 
orders,” with attention to their effects on aggregate incarceration levels). 
 59. THOMAS H. CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIVEST & CLIFFORD STEIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009) (defining an algorithm as “any well-defined 
computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some 
value, or set of values, as outcome” (emphases omitted)); see also MARTIN ERWIG, ONCE UPON 
AN ALGORITHM: HOW STORIES EXPLAIN COMPUTING 26–27 (2017) (offering an illuminating 
conceptual account of algorithms); Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 
PHIL. & TECH. 1, 3 (2017) (describing algorithms in terms of whether a system will “take in certain 
inputs and produce certain outputs by computational means”).  
 60. For an analysis of the scope of discretion in the federal context at present, see Kevin R. 
Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 68 (2017).  
 61. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 31 (1968).  
 62. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949). 
 63. Id. at 175.  
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rules and instead has preferred “practical, common-sense judgment.”64 
Algorithmic criminal justice represents a categorical rejection of such 
ad hoc, situated judgments as an instrument of regulation. 
Second, automation is required because of the sheer volume of 
data used by these tools. Law enforcement agencies increasingly have 
access to pools of data that are “vast, fast, disparate, and digital.”65 
Colloquially, the instruments at issue here rely on “big data” as that 
term is used in computational science.66 The Los Angeles Police 
Department, for example, has supplemented traditional law 
enforcement databases of persons arrested or convicted of crimes with 
information about all contacts, of any sort, with police, social services, 
health services, and child welfare services.67 This data is integrated with 
data from “dragnet surveillance tools,” closed-circuit television 
(“CCTV”) cameras used to acquire and track license plate numbers, 
and “privately collected data.”68 Because the ensuing massive data 
pools cannot be sorted by hand, they are only useful because of 
advances in processing power and computational software. The IC 
Realtime Company, for instance, offers an application called “Ella,” 
which can recognize and execute natural language queries for CCTV 
footage.69 Such changes in the speed and accuracy of queries effect a 
step change in the quality of surveillance-based evidence available to 
police. 
Third, these algorithmic instruments make out-of-sample 
predictions about new actors’ likely criminal conduct. It is true that 
algorithmic instruments can also be applied to extant pools of big data 
in order to identify historical crimes. For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission analyzes large volumes of trading to identify 
 
 64. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983). The Court has stressed police expertise rather 
than formal rules. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws 
inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person.”). 
 65. Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 980 
(2017).  
 66. DAWN E. HOLMES, BIG DATA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 15–16 (2017) 
(characterizing big data as “huge amounts of data that has not been collected with any specific 
questions in mind and is often unstructured” and that is characterized by “volume, variety, and 
velocity”). 
 67. Brayne, supra note 65, at 995. 
 68. Id. at 992–95.  
 69. James Vincent, Artificial Intelligence is Going to Supercharge Surveillance, VERGE (Jan. 
23, 2018, 10:54 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/23/16907238/artificial-intelligence-
surveillance-cameras-security [https://perma.cc/U4SN-VFL2].  
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investors who might be engaged in insider trading.70 Pattern analysis of 
this kind can raise questions of racial effects. But it does so in different 
ways from out-of-sample prediction methods. The instruments I’m 
focused on here are generally calibrated using one pool of data and 
then applied to new data as a means of identifying or predicting crime 
that was previously unknown and that, typically, has not yet occurred. 
For example, a parole board might have information on historical 
patterns of reoffending. It supplies that data to a machine-learning 
tool, which in turn generates a test for forecasting recidivism by 
suspects yet to interact with the criminal justice system.71 
So defined, algorithmic criminal justice tools are inductive rather 
than deductive. They lack opportunities for verification via the 
collation of other indicia of lawbreaking. Algorithmic criminal justice, 
moreover, claims no insight into the causes of crime or criminality.72 It 
is just an arrow pointing at crime’s likely next incidence. 
B. The Operation of Algorithmic Criminal Justice 
I have already discussed two instances of algorithmic criminal 
justice, the COMPAS algorithm and the SSL. These examples, though, 
do not provide a good measure of the scope and effects of algorithmic 
criminal justice’s operation. New technologies of machine learning 
(and in particular the subspecies of deep learning) are likely to 
dominate algorithmic criminal justice in the future. As a result, both 
COMPAS and the SSL algorithms are likely soon to be relics. Newer 
tools will combine powerful computational instruments with large 
volumes of data to enable prediction of a kind that is qualitatively 
distinct from historical antecedents.73 A survey of the potential uses of 
 
 70. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 41st Annual 
Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/ 
Detail/Speech/1370540677500 [https://perma.cc/M7YV-33PR] (describing the SEC’s NEAT 
program, which can identify and analyze insider trading activity around times of major corporate 
events). 
 71. Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole 
Board Decisions and Recividism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 193, 195 (2017).  
 72. Cf. Usama Fayyad, The Digital Physics of Data Mining, 44 COMM. ACM 62, 62, 64 (2001) 
(“Even with all these techniques [for data mining algorithms], we have taken only the first 
unsteady steps toward addressing such difficult problems as understanding and exploiting the 
meaning of information hidden from our perception in the higher dimension.”).  
 73. See JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 
39 (2016) (pointing to “improvements in computing speed and memory, the transition from 
physically to electronically stored data, easier access (mainly due to the Internet), and low-cost 
high-resolution digital sensors” as the technological predicates of machine learning). 
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these new instruments allows a fuller sense of the scope of algorithmic 
prediction tools and the effects that they will have on criminal justice. 
1. Machine Learning and Deep Learning.  A machine-learning 
algorithm solves a “learning problem . . . of improving some measure 
of performance when executing some task, through some type of 
training experience.”74 The basic task a supervised machine-learning 
algorithm must perform can be framed as follows: The algorithm is 
prompted to define a function f(x) which produces an output y for any 
given input x. In other words, it classifies x in terms of y.75 Its outputs 
take the form of a sorting of x onto categories of y.76 The resulting 
classifications are correlational rather than causal in nature.77 Hence, 
its performance is measured in terms of how well it captures the 
relation of x to y.78 
To begin, a supervised machine-learning algorithm is assigned a 
set of “training” data labeled in terms of y so it can develop a model, 
represented by the mathematical function f(x), that best represents the 
relationship between features of each observation in the training data 
and the known classification y. This function f(x) is then applied to a 
new “test set” of data.79 The algorithm predicts how to classify this new 
data by applying f(x) to generate predictions of y.80 Such supervised 
tools are but one kind of machine learning. There is also a species of 
 
 74. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 34, at 255. 
 75. Id. This process can also be described in terms of a “classifier,” rather than a function, 
that examines inputs with “feature values” and outputs a class variable. Pedro Domingos, A Few 
Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55 COMM. ACM 78, 79, 82 (2012) (emphases 
omitted) (“A classifier is a system that inputs (typically) a vector of discrete and/or continuous 
feature values and outputs a single discrete value, the class.”).  
 76. PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT 
MAKE SENSE OF DATA 14 (2012) (noting that “multi-class classification” is “a machine learning 
task in its own right”). 
 77. Consider in this regard recommendation algorithms employed by consumer-facing 
companies such as Amazon and Netflix. Cf. KAPLAN, supra note 73, at 32 (arguing that machine-
learning algorithms operate like “incredibly skilled mimics, finding correlations and responding 
to novel inputs as if to say, ‘This reminds me of . . . ,’ and in doing so imitate successful strategies 
gleaned from a large collection of examples”). 
 78. See Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 34, at 255–57 (noting that performance can be defined 
in terms of accuracy, with false positive and false negative rates being assigned a variety of 
weights). 
 79. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 32, at 40 (describing the use of training and validation data); 
HOLMES, supra note 66, at 24 (discussing classification and distinguishing training and test sets of 
data).  
 80. See STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 693–97 (3d ed. 2010).  
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unsupervised machine-learning algorithms. These begin with unlabeled 
training data and tend to be tasked with the development of 
classifications based on the data’s immanent structure.81 
No machine-learning algorithm is given ex ante a functional form 
f(x) that defines the relationship between observations and 
classifications. Rather, the algorithm employs one of a wide number of 
procedures to ascertain f(x) through a process called “feature 
selection.”82 The latter includes decision trees, decision forests, logistic 
regression, support vector machines, neural networks, kernel 
machines, and Bayesian classifiers.83 Each of these tools identifies a 
mathematical criterion for selection, f(x), by testing many potential 
criteria using training data. By sorting though many different possible 
f(x)s on the basis of its training data using one of these methods, the 
algorithm homes in upon an f(x) that optimizes the accuracy of its 
performance metric. Many people encounter this kind of machine 
learning in interactions with Siri, Alexa, or other virtual assistants.84 
Deep learning is a subset of machine learning whereby the 
algorithm is made up of “multiple levels of representation,” each of 
which transforms the raw data into a slightly more abstract form.85 
Given enough layers of transformation, the algorithm can perform very 
complex functions. It can, for instance, play the Chinese game Go or 
recognize specific images from representational input.86 What 
 
 81. See FLACH, supra note 76, at 14–17.  
 82. See Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 681 (describing feature selection as concerning the 
“choices about which data models should consider”); see also Avrim L. Blum & Pat Langley, 
Selection of Relevant Features and Examples in Machine Learning, 97 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
245, 250–53 (1997) (decomposing feature selection into a nested sequence of analytic tasks); 
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About 
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 700–01 (2017) (describing feature selection). 
 83. See David J. Hand, Classifier Technology and the Illusion of Progress, 21 STAT. SCI. 1, 1, 
3 (2006) (documenting these instruments and contending that, in “real-world conditions,” simpler 
instruments often perform better). 
 84. See 9 Applications of Machine Learning From Day-to-Day Life, MEDIUM (July 30, 2017), 
https://medium.com/app-affairs/9-applications-of-machine-learning-from-day-to-day-life-
112a47a429d0/ [https://perma.cc/GNE6-X6W5].  
 85. LeCun et al., supra note 35, at 436, 438 (“A deep-learning architecture is a multilayer 
stack of simple modules, all (or most) of which are subject to learning, and many of which compute 
non-linear input-output mappings.”); see generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 32, at 85–109 
(describing neural networks). For a nontechnical account of back propagation, the key element 
of deep learning, see James Somers, Is AI Riding a One-Trick Pony?, 120 MIT TECH. REV. 29, 31 
(2017).  
 86. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, This More Powerful Version of AlphaGo Learns on Its Own, 
WIRED (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/this-more-powerful-version-of-
alphago-learns-on-its-own [https://perma.cc/L38N-D94H] (describing a program that not only 
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distinguishes deep learning is that its “layers of features are not 
designed by human engineers: they are learned from data using a 
general-purpose learning procedure.”87 The most well-known forms of 
deep-learning tools are based on “neural networks,” which are very 
loosely inspired by patterns observed in the human brain.88 Deep-
learning instruments are especially apt for unsupervised tasks, with no 
specification of features and little “manual interference,” such that 
designers “just wait and let the learning algorithm discover all that is 
necessary by itself.”89 The utility to police of an instrument that can 
extract speech or visual patterns from large quantities of audio-visual 
inputs (e.g., CCTV footage, cellphone call content) is self-evident.90 
2. The Impact of Machine Learning on Criminal Justice.  Adoption 
of machine learning within the criminal justice system changes the 
scale, reach, and operation of state power. Consider each of these 
parameters in turn. 
First, these tools dramatically inflate the state’s ability to acquire 
otherwise inaccessible information.91 For instance, police in London 
and in South Wales now track individuals’ locations and movements 
over days and weeks by applying machine-learning tools to thousands 
of hours of CCTV footage.92 Machine-learning tools also facilitate 
predictions that would be far less precise if based solely upon more 
familiar regression analyses.93 
 
wins board games but “showcases an approach to teaching machines new tricks that makes them 
less reliant on humans”).  
 87. LeCun et al., supra note 35, at 436. 
 88. See Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview, 61 NEURAL 
NETWORKS 85, 86–87 (2015).  
 89. ALPAYDIN, supra note 32, at 309.  
 90. See Maryam M. Najafabadi et al., Deep Learning Applications and Challenges in Big 
Data Analytics, 1 J. BIG DATA 1, 11–13 (2015) (describing uses of deep-learning tools). Deep 
learning has also been used to play “games of perfect information,” such as chess and Go. See, 
e.g., David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search, 
529 NATURE 484, 490 (2016). 
 91. For recognition of this general point, see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance 
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive,” thereby “giving the police access 
to surveillance techniques that are ever cheaper and ever more effective”). 
 92. David Bond, CCTV Watchdog Warns UK Police over Use of Facial Recognition, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ab60f9f2-bb26-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589 
[https://perma.cc/3HC2-9TBF]. 
 93. See Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer, Prediction 
Policy Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 493–94 (2015) (comparing a machine-learning 
prediction to a regression analysis in forecasting whether elderly osteoarthritis patients will live 
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Second, machine-learning instruments sever the connection 
between the human operator and the function f(x) used to solve the 
classification problem. Unstructured human discretion, which once 
infused the criminal justice system, is displaced by an algorithmically 
structured logic not wrought by any human hand. As a result, it will 
often not be possible to speak of the intent or the anticipated 
consequences of a classification protocol. Rather, the algorithm will 
“sift through vast numbers of variables, looking for combinations that 
reliably predict outcomes,” “handling enormous numbers of 
predictors—sometimes, remarkably, more predictors than 
observations—and combining them in nonlinear and highly interactive 
ways,”94 hence generating utterly unexpected outcomes. 
Moreover, to the extent that the design of a machine-learning 
process involves the intentional crafting and selection of training data, 
feature sets, or the like, there will often be no way to directly ascertain 
the role of designers’ racial sentiments (if any)95 and no easy way to 
indirectly infer intentionality from the instrument’s results.96 There is 
no such thing as code that bespeaks racial animus. Design choices that 
might be molded by racial animus also cannot be reverse engineered to 
cast light on background human motivations. And it is difficult to know 
how to disentangle the effect of background differences in criminality 
and discriminating designer intent when evaluating the outputs of an 
algorithm. As a result, the effects of, and evidence for, human 
intentions—a central element of legal and constitutional analysis—are 
likely to be elusive. 
Third, algorithmic tools can be as sticky or stickier than the forms 
of human discretion. Hence, whereas it is always a possibility that 
human agents will observe the unintended effects of human action, 
machine decision-making can be opaque and hence resistant to change. 
Algorithmic systems can thus be “stuck in time until engineers dive in 
 
long enough to benefit from joint replacement surgeries). 
 94. Ziad Obermeyer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the Future—Big Data, Machine 
Learning, and Clinical Medicine, 13 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1216, 1217 (2016) (citation omitted).  
 95. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 51, at 710 (“The idea that the representation of different 
social groups in the dataset can be brought into proportions that better match those in the real 
world presumes that analysts have some independent mechanism for determining these 
proportions.”). 
 96. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 (2013) 
(noting how predictions can be generated in processes “which [are] not explainable in human 
language,” such that “[i]t would be difficult for the government to provide a detailed response 
when asked why an individual was singled out to receive differentiated treatment by an automated 
recommendation system”). 
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to change them.”97 Indeed, it will often not be clear to a human 
operator that an algorithmic criminal justice tool needs 
reconsideration. That human operator necessarily sees only a limited 
and unrepresentative tranche of case outcomes. She must also grapple 
with the sheer technological complexity of algorithmic tools. Hence, 
algorithmic errors are often liable to prove more durable than human 
errors. 
Fourth, the consequences of switching between unstructured 
human discretion and algorithmically structured prediction can often 
be unexpected. This happens even when a semistructured instrument 
is altered. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision 
eliminating the mandatory character of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, studies found “significantly increased racial disparities 
after controlling for extensive offender and crime characteristics.”98 
This was not, one hopes, the Court’s ambition. 
Fifth, the emerging crop of algorithmic tools are potentially very 
different from risk assessment tools currently employed in bail and 
sentencing. Current instruments rely on a relatively small number of 
variables—two leading models use 12 and 20 parameters, 
respectively—and fixed classification rules to generate recidivism 
risks.99 These instruments focus solely on recidivism risk. They make 
no effort to estimate either the direct or the remote costs of coercive 
action. In contrast, tools such as COMPAS include recommended 
cutoff points that at least imply an evaluation of aggregate social costs. 
There is no reason, moreover, that an algorithm could not be trained 
with data that reflects both the costs and the benefits of coercive action, 
broadly understood. This does not appear to be standard practice yet. 
To summarize, the operation and the effects of predictions offered 
by algorithmic criminal justice are qualitatively distinct from the 
unstructured and semistructured forms of human discretion that have 
until now dominated the criminal justice system. Not all such tools use 
machine learning or deep learning. But it is only a question of time 
before these powerful instruments crowd out simpler models. Indeed, 
 
 97. O’NEIL, supra note 52, at 204.  
 98. Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal 
Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 77 (2015); see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 54 (2007) (presenting a similar finding). 
 99. Slobogin, supra note 47, at 584–86 (explaining the OxRec and VRAG assessment tools); 
see also Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 
837, 869–71 (describing the PSA tool).  
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it is striking that both the COMPAS algorithm and the SSL instrument 
described in the Introduction have been criticized on the basis of their 
weak predictive power100: A likely, if not inevitable, consequence of 
such critiques is the adoption of new, more powerful computational 
tools to achieve the same end. In any event, a phase shift in the quality 
of criminal justice action can already be observed across the spectrum 
of criminal justice functionalities. Even if machine-learning and deep-
learning tools are not now omnipresent, they will be soon.101 
C. Algorithmic Criminal Justice on the Ground 
Algorithmic tools are used now in three main criminal justice 
contexts: policing, bail decisions, and post-conviction matters. This 
section provides a capsule summary of the ways in which predictive 
instruments are operationalized across those three distinct domains. 
1. Policing.  In the policing context, algorithmic tools are 
employed to make predictions about both places and people.102 Place-
focused tools aggregate “real-time” information on the frequency and 
geographic location of crimes to “determine staffing needs or allocate 
resources” as between different regions.103 Consonant with a focus on 
the location of crime, police departments across the country have 
 
 100. See Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting 
Recidivism, SCIENCE ADVANCES (Jan. 17, 2018), http://advances.sciencemag.org/ 
content/4/1/eaao5580 [https://perma.cc/9WC8-CDES] (finding that the COMPAS algorithm 
performs no better than people with no experience with the criminal justice system in making 
recidivism predictions); Jessica Saunders, Priscillia Hunt & John S. Hollywood, Predictions Put 
into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 363 (2016) (finding that “while using arrestee social 
networks improved the identification of future homicide victims, the number was still too low in 
the pilot to make a meaningful impact on crime”). 
 101. One reason for this, of course, is the promotion of algorithmic implements by the 
companies that manufacture them and stand to gain financially from their adoption. See Elizabeth 
E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 101, 114–20 (2017) (describing mechanisms of private influence on public adoption of 
computational technologies in the criminal justice sector). 
 102. See RAND CORP., PREDICTIVE POLICING: FORECASTING CRIME FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 2 (2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/
RB9700/RB9735/RAND_RB9735.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8GG-MSJ7]; see also JENNIFER 
BACHNER, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, PREDICTIVE POLICING: PREVENTING CRIME 
WITH DATA AND ANALYTICS 14 (2013), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/
default/files/Predictive%20Policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CS8-5X37] (“The fundamental notion 
underlying the theory and practice of predictive policing is that we can make probabilistic 
inferences about future criminal activity based on existing data.”).  
 103. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing 
“High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 182 (2011). 
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increasingly adopted the Compstat, or Crime Control Strategy 
Meeting, structure first developed in New York. Under Compstat, 
precinct commanders are subject to biweekly questioning by senior 
departmental leadership in a “data-saturated environment” about how 
they are responding to crime trends.104 While Compstat itself does not 
necessarily incorporate algorithmic tools, its focus on data-driven 
predictions of crime’s geographic dispersion invites the use of 
algorithmic tools. Further, a number of criminologists have identified 
promise in a place-based prediction approach involving “the 
application of police interventions at very small geographic units of 
analysis,” or hot spots.105 A number of randomized, controlled 
experiments have found evidence that such place-focused tools are 
effective in suppressing crime.106 
Consistent with these developments, influential jurisdictions have 
adopted machine-learning tools to facilitate place-based policing.107 
One of the earliest adopters, starting in 2015, was the New York Police 
Department. This force embarked on a two-year pilot program using 
HunchLab, an algorithm developed by the Philadelphia-based Azavea 
company.108 According to Azavea’s web site, HunchLab’s “ensemble 
machine learning” algorithm uses “temporal cycles” (day of week, 
seasonality); “weather”; “risk terrain modeling” (locations of bars, bus 
stops, etc.); “socioeconomic indicators”; historic crime levels; and near-
 
 104. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of 
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 
41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 148 (2007); see also David L. Carter & Jeremy G. Carter, Intelligence-
Led Policing: Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y 
REV. 310, 320–22 (2009) (comparing intelligence-led policing with CompStat). 
 105. ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES: CRIME 
HOT SPOTS AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 9 (2010). More generally, proactive policing of various 
kinds—not necessarily involving stops—is also associated with crime-control effects. See Charis 
E. Kubrin, Steven F. Messner, Glenn Deane, Kelly McGeever & Thomas D. Stucky, Proactive 
Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 62–63 (2010).  
 106. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: 
A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008) (Lowell, Massachusetts); Anthony 
A. Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring & Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Problem-Oriented 
Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Control Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541 
(1999) (Jersey City, New Jersey). 
 107. See, e.g., J. Brian Charles, How Police in One City Are Using Tech to Fight Gangs, 
GOVERNING (Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-gang-
violence-predictive-policing-high-point-lc.html?r [https://perma.cc/2TVR-8UJC] (describing the 
use of ONESolution predictive software by the High Point, North Carolina, police department).  
 108. See Laura Nahmias & Miranda Neubauer, NYPD Testing Crime-Forecast Software, 
POLITICO (July 8, 2015, 5:52 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/
2015/07/nypd-testing-crime-forecast-software-090820 [https://perma.cc/3G49-UP9B]. 
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repeat patterns as a means of predicting individual crime expectations 
across the jurisdiction.109 Other cities, such as Los Angeles, have 
adopted a system created by the PredPol company. PredPol produces 
a propriety algorithm based on a “near-repeat” machine-learning 
model. This assumes that if a crime occurs at a given location, the 
immediate surroundings are at increased risk for future crime.110 First 
developed by anthropologist Jeffrey Brantingham and mathematician 
Andrea Bertozzi, the PredPol model is an extrapolation of an 
algorithm used to predict the distribution of earthquake shocks.111 One 
randomized, controlled study observed the use of a machine-learning 
tool derived from models of epidemic aftershocks to implement hot-
spot policing; it found that the instrument predicted crime well and led 
to a 7.4 percent reduction in crime volume as a function of patrol 
time.112 
In the last five years, however, authorities have begun to 
supplement place-focused tools with person-focused tools. Chicago, 
for example, started to build a database of alleged gang members in 
order to draw inferences about their propensity to commit violent 
crimes.113 That city’s SSL predicts the likelihood of an individual 
becoming a homicide victim using an analysis of that person’s known 
social network—in particular, by counting the number of first-degree 
co-arrest links and the number of second-degree co-arrest links with 
previous homicide victims.114 Names generated by the SSL algorithm 
were disseminated to district commanders, who had discretion about 
what interventions to apply.115 The algorithm, however, identified less 
 
 109. AZAVEA, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD 12 (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/
hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf [https://perma.cc/45YT-6F69].  
 110. See Brayne, supra note 65, at 989–90; see generally How PredPol Works: Predictive 
Policing, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works [https://perma.cc/
8J3A-GHLN] (providing a predictably rosy overview of the algorithm’s uses). 
 111. Aaron Shapiro, Reform Predictive Policing, 541 NATURE 458, 459 (2017); see also 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
35, 44–45 (2014) (describing PredPol’s use in Santa Cruz, California).  
 112. G. O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399, 1407 (2015).  
 113. John Buntin, Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence, 
GOVERNING (Oct. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-social-
media-transforms-chicago-policing.html [https://perma.cc/ALA4-FSGL] (describing how data 
was acquired for social media analysis). 
 114. Saunders et al., supra note 100, at 354.  
 115. Id. at 354–55; cf. Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(July 20, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder 
[https://perma.cc/25P7-SCFH] (discussing predictive policing techniques in Chicago, including 
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than one percent of the pool of eventual homicide victims and yielded 
no identifiable crime-control gains.116 In a similar vein, some 
jurisdictions use machine-learning tools to mine social services records 
for predictions of child abuse.117 
A related use of deep-learning tools involves facial recognition 
algorithms that can search for dangerous persons in a specific place at 
a particular time. This emerging use is not a matter of out-of-sample 
prediction; it is a matching exercise based on new data. As such, it falls 
at the periphery of my analysis. For instance, the Metropolitan Police 
of London combine dense CCTV with facial recognition instruments 
in monitoring certain public events, although not (yet) for purposes 
such as terrorism and serious crime prevention.118 In May 2017, the 
deployment of facial recognition algorithms to real-time CCTV inputs 
generated the first arrest of its kind for British police.119 
The situation in the United States is less clear. As of 2016, at least 
five metropolitan police departments—including Chicago’s, Dallas’s, 
and Los Angeles’s—claimed to use, or expressed interest in buying, a 
facial recognition algorithm to comb public CCTV data.120 Facial 
images have been made available by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation since 2011.121 In 2017, Orlando, Florida, and Washington 
County, Oregon, were identified as purchasers of Amazon’s 
“Rekognition” tool, which uses “artificial intelligence” to scan and 
identify up to a hundred faces in a single CCTV shot.122 Nevertheless, 
 
sending officers to the houses of suspected gang leaders). 
 116. Saunders et al., supra note 100, at 363; see id. at 365 (noting that those included on the 
SSL list were in fact less likely to be a victim of a shooting, although that difference was not 
statistically significant).  
 117. Rachel Courtland, The Bias Detectives: The Researchers Striving to Make Science Fair, 
558 NATURE 357, 358 (2018).  
 118. See Mark Townsend, Police To Use Facial-Recognition Cameras at Cenotaph Service, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/12/
metropolitan-police-to-use-facial-recognition-technology-remembrance-sunday-cenotaph 
[https://perma.cc/PF2B-KZHS].  
 119. Cara McGoogan, British Police Arrest Suspect Spotted with Facial Recognition 
Technology, TELEGRAPH (June 7, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
2017/06/07/british-police-arrest-suspect-spotted-facial-recognition-technology 
[https://perma.cc/Q5H7-W4QF].  
 120. CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, CTR. ON PRIVACY & 
TECH. AT GEORGETOWN LAW, THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE 
RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 2 (2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3145908/The-
Perpetual-Line-Up-By-The-Center-on-Privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN64-FAMU].  
 121. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-267, FACE RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 7, 15 (2016).  
 122. Matt Cagle & Nicole Ozer, Amazon Teams Up with Government To Deploy Dangerous 
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real-time application of facial recognition technologies to CCTV data 
still appears rare, in particular because of technological barriers. It is 
telling that between June and September 2017, the National Institute 
for Science and Technology offered a prize for facial recognition 
technology. The winner of the contest, NTechLab, created an 
algorithm with a rate of 0.22 false nonmatches for every 0.001 false 
matches.123 And in 2018, as noted above, the IC Realtime company 
introduced a commercially available algorithm called Ella that can 
recognize and respond to natural language queries to search large 
quantities of video footage for specific images.124 
2. Bail.  The second use of algorithmic tools is in the pretrial 
context of arraignment hearings, in which judges determine whether 
defendants are to be detained pending criminal trial or released having 
posted a money bail or otherwise. Pretrial detainees comprise roughly 
60 percent of the jail population, and between 2005 and 2013 some 
450,000 people were incarcerated awaiting trial on any given day.125 
Pretrial detention decisions impose considerable costs on individuals 
in relation to employment, health outcomes, and childcare costs.126 One 
study, for example, estimates a lower-bound net cost of detention for 
the marginal individual of $55,385 and an upper-bound net cost of 
$101,223.127 At the same time, “[r]elatively little is known with regard 
to charge characteristics and case dispositions” for that pretrial 
 
New Facial Recognition Technology, ACLU (May 22, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazon-teams-
government-deploy-dangerous-new?redirect=blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/amazon-teams-law-enforcement-deploy-dangerous-new [https://perma.cc/D5LY-
MK68]. 
 123. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN, KAYEE HANAOKA, CHRIS BOEHNEN & LARS 
ERICSON, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8197, THE 2017 IARPA FACE 
RECOGNITION PRIZE CHALLENGE (FRPC) 2 (2017).  
 124. Vincent, supra note 69.  
 125. Jaeok Kim, Preeti Chauhan, Olive Lu, Meredith Patten & Sandra Susan Smith, 
Unpacking Pretrial Detention: An Examination of Patterns and Predictors of Readmissions, 29 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 663, 664 (2018); see also ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON 
STUDIES, WORLD PRE-TRIAL/REMAND IMPRISONMENT LIST 1 (2d ed. 2014), 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_pre-trial_ 
imprisonment_list_2nd_edition_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9MX-4NAD] (describing the “number 
of prisoners held in pre-trial detention and other forms of remand imprisonment in 211 
independent countries and dependent territories”). 
 126. For a discussion of the costs of pretrial detention, see Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous 
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 546–57 (2018).  
 127. Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1436 (2017).  
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detention population.128 But studies in a range of jurisdictions find 
evidence of racial disparities in bail decisions. Predictably, if 
dismayingly, black and Latino defendants receive systematically less 
favorable treatment.129 
Much of the impetus for recent bail reform has hinged on the oft-
criticized effect of wealth upon access to pretrial release.130 Algorithmic 
criminal justice does not necessarily respond to this problem, except to 
the extent it enables a reduction of pretrial detention generally without 
imposing any cost on crime-related outcomes.131 Rather, such tools are 
an obvious fit in a context where magistrates are forced to make 
predictive decisions about the risk of violence, criminality, or flight on 
the basis of relatively cursory information. Already, two simple 
algorithms, the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”) and the Canadian 
Level of Service Inventory Revised (“LSI-R”), use information 
ranging from criminal history to personality patterns and age to offer 
recidivism predictions.132 The latter instrument, however, is 
administered by professionals through interviews—it involves no 
computational element.133 More sophisticated algorithmic instruments 
are now starting to be introduced into courtrooms to inform bond 
determinations in jurisdictions across the country.134 
 
 128. Kim et al., supra note 125, at 667. 
 129. See Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity 
in the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 234 (2004) (“Black and especially Hispanic 
defendants receive less favorable pretrial treatment than white defendants.”); Traci Schlesinger, 
Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170, 175–76, 187 (2005) 
(presenting the same result for hold rates within a given county using the nationally representative 
State Court Processing Statistics); Yang, supra note 127, at 1466–67 (finding “compelling evidence 
that bail judges in these jurisdictions treat defendants of different races differently in setting 
bail”). But see Frank McIntyre & Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Pretrial Detention, 10 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 741, 769 (2013) (rejecting any finding of racial disparities after having 
controlled for the probability of re-arrest). 
 130. See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/AST3-
9UBB] (“[In New York City,] only 15 percent of defendants are able to come up with the money 
to avoid jail.”). 
 131. See Aviva Shen & CityLab, New Orleans’ Great Bail-Reform Experiment, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/new-orleans-great-bail-
reform-experiment/544964 [https://perma.cc/7UG9-3LHK] (finding that both the pretrial 
detention and the pretrial crime rate had fallen using the tool). 
 132. Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice [https://perma.cc/4E4A-GXDL].  
 133. Alexander M. Holsinger, Implementation of Actuarial Risk/Need Assessment and Its 
Effect on Community Supervision Revocations, 15 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 95, 98–99 (2013). 
 134. Ellora Thadaney Israni, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.html 
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Numerous jurisdictions give judges access to the COMPAS system 
in the pretrial arraignment context.135 But there is a surprising paucity 
of public information about the manner of its implementation and its 
effects on the rates of pretrial release or on the composition of the 
pretrial detainee population. Two studies, one conducted in New York 
City and the other in an unnamed large American city, compared the 
predictive accuracy of different machine-learning algorithms with that 
of judges. Both found that the computational method generated less 
misranking of criminal defendants and less crime.136 These studies, 
however, focus narrowly on the important question of gains to public 
safety that would result from a move from human to machine 
prediction. The studies appear to assume that jurisdictions will respond 
to algorithmic criminal justice instruments by using less pretrial 
incarceration to obtain the same levels of deterrence. It is not clear, 
though, why this assumption is warranted. These studies are silent as 
to the possibility or magnitude of racial effects–a striking omission 
given the large empirical literature documenting racial disparities in 
bail decisions.137 
3. Sentencing.  A recent survey of state sentencing practice 
comments that it is “improbable” that any convicted felon, whether an 
adult or juvenile, would be sentenced today without the aid of some 
sort of actuarial risk instrument, albeit not necessarily one that employs 
 
[https://perma.cc/6ZQ2-NTAB]; see also Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning 
Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 223 (2015) (explaining 
advantages of machine-learning tools over the LSI-R); Richard F. Lowden, Risk Assessment 
Algorithms: The Answer to an Inequitable Bail System?, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 221, 230–31 (2018) 
(listing jurisdictions that have adopted algorithmic tools).  
 135. See Angwin et al., supra note 16 (“As often happens with risk assessment tools, many 
jurisdictions have adopted Northpointe’s [COMPAS] software before rigorously testing whether 
it works.”). It is not wholly clear how much weight judges give to the COMPAS scores, or whether 
there is even a uniform practice.  
 136. See Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting Domestic 
Violence: A Machine Learning Approach To Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94, 110 (2016) (finding that the release rate of 20 percent repeat 
offenders in a pool of domestic violent defendants could be dropped to a 10 percent rate through 
a move from judicial to machine-led determinations); Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure 
Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 
Q. J. ECON. 237, 237–38 (2018) [hereinafter Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions] (finding that large 
decreases in offending rates could be achieved by moving from judicial to machine predictions in 
the bail context for violent crimes).  
 137. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. One study to address potential racial effects 
is Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions, supra note 136, at 237. 
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algorithmic means.138 In some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, New 
Hampshire, Arkansas, and Vermont, state law even affirmatively 
mandates the use of predictive instruments in the sentencing phase.139 
Such instruments have emerged as part of a “full-on embrace of 
practices that promise to reduce the risk of reoffending by convicted 
persons . . . .”140 The federal FIRST STEP141 Act also embraces 
algorithmic risk assessment tools for determining early prison 
release.142 
In 2015, more than 60 risk assessment tools were used in 
sentencing contexts.143 Risk assessments typically evaluate where 
within a statutorily calibrated sentencing range an offender’s sentence 
should lie, accounting for “utilitarian crime-control grounds.”144 Some 
jurisdictions, such as Virginia, use a noncomputational “actuarial” 
instrument calibrated by age, felony record, offense type, employment, 
and gender, to sort nonviolent, low-risk offenders to alternative 
punishments such as probation, jail time, and restitution.145 In other 
jurisdictions, computational instruments such as COMPAS are used 
 
 138. See Zachary Hamilton et al., Designed To Fit: The Development and Validation of the 
STRONG-R Recidivism Risk Assessment, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 230, 231 (2016).  
 139. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-615(a)(1)(B) (2016) (“The determination . . . shall be made 
by reviewing information such as the result of the risk-needs assessment to inform the decision of 
whether to release a person on parole by quantifying that person’s risk to reoffend, and if parole 
is granted, this information shall be used to set conditions for supervision.”); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 504-A:15(I) (2017) (requiring that “[e]very person placed on probation or parole . . . be 
assessed by the department of corrections, using a valid and objective risk assessment tool, to 
determine that person’s risk of recidivating” and that the results be used to determine the length 
of active supervision); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2018) (adopting a “risk assessment 
instrument” that may aid in the determination of “the relative risk that an offender will reoffend 
and be a threat to public safety”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554c(a)(1) (2017) (“The objective of 
a pretrial risk assessment is to provide information to the court for the purpose of determining 
whether a person presents a risk of nonappearance or a risk of re-offense so the court can make 
an appropriate order concerning bail and conditions of pretrial release.”).  
 140. Klingele, supra note 58, at 551–52. 
 141. Formerly incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person 
(FIRST STEP) Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (to be codified at scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C.  
 142. Bärí A. Williams, The Prison-Reforming First Step Act Has a Critical Software Bug, FAST 
COMPANY, Dec. 21, 2018, https://www.fastcompany.com/90284823/the-first-step-acts-reliance-
on-algorithms-is-a-misstep [https://perma.cc/RTG8-KU2Q].  
 143. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman & Dana Goldstein, Should Prison Sentences 
Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/YU6N-
AHCA].  
 144. See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 493–94 (2016).  
 145. Id. at 495.  
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for that same purpose.146 Such instruments have only recently attracted 
judicial attention, including a high-profile constitutional challenge to 
Wisconsin’s algorithm.147 
Finally, I have located only one well-detailed example of a 
machine-learning algorithm being employed in the parole context. In 
2010, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole started 
developing a machine-learning protocol using random forests to 
generate forecasts of recidivism to assist members of the Board in 
making discrete parole decisions.148 When subject to performance 
evaluation seven years later, the algorithm was found to have reduced 
re-arrests for both nonviolent and violent crime.149 
D. The Emerging Evidence of Race Effects 
Race, its effects, and its legacies loom large in criminal justice.150 
To date, however, consideration of the racial effects (if any) of 
algorithmic criminal justice has been piecemeal. This section briefly 
surveys existing studies of algorithmic criminal justice systems that 
touch on questions of race. This survey hints at real reasons for closely 
analyzing the racial effects of algorithmic tools on criminal justice. 
1. Policing and the Problem of Tainted Training Data.  In the 
policing context, the unthinking use of algorithmic instruments will 
reinforce historical race-based patterns of policing.151 This may occur 
because algorithmic predictions will vary depending on the quality of 
the training data used to construct the predictive function. For 
example, if the training data systematically omits data about certain 
subsets of a population—if it has what Kate Crawford calls “black 
 
 146. Angwin et al., supra note 16.  
 147. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (upholding the use of the COMPAS 
tool in sentencing in Wisconsin); infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (discussing Loomis). 
 148. Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole 
Board Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 193, 195 (2017) 
[hereinafter Berk, Impact Assessment]. For a clear and nontechnical explanation of random 
forests methods, see D. Richard Cutler et al., Random Forests for Classification in Ecology, 88 
ECOLOGY 2783, 2784–85 (2007). 
 149. Berk, Impact Assessment, supra note 148, at 212–13.  
 150. See supra notes 10, 12.  
 151. Brayne, supra note 65, at 997 (arguing that “data-driven surveillance practices may be 
implicated in the reproduction of inequality . . . by deepening the surveillance of individuals 
already under suspicion; [by] widening the criminal justice dragnet unequally; and leading people 
to avoid ‘surveilling’ institutions that are fundamental to social integration”).  
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holes”152—it will generate results that fail to account for some 
population. Such gaps can be a function of poor relations between law 
enforcement and certain communities. For example, imagine a 
jurisdiction that allocates patrol resources based on historical reports 
of crime. Neighborhoods characterized by poor relations with police 
might underreport crime, such that they receive fewer policing 
resources in the future. 
Note, however, that algorithmic tools might also be used to 
compensate for asymmetrical data gaps. For example, the Shotspotter 
system records shots fired in urban environments. It can thus reveal 
neighborhoods in which residents do not report shootings to police.153 
This has at least the potential to mitigate historical enforcement gaps. 
To conclude that algorithmic instruments will either necessarily 
undermine, or necessarily perpetuate, historical imbalances in the 
allocation of criminal justice resources seems premature. They can do 
both. It just depends on how carefully training data is selected and on 
how the algorithm is then designed. 
Policy distortions might also arise if historical data of police 
activity, deployed as training data for an algorithmic tool, is infected by 
the racial presumptions and stereotypes of the past officials. This kind 
of measurement effort has been found in studies concerning health 
services to “create decision and allocation biases.”154 A concern here is 
a variant on a worry common in medical research that “race is such a 
dominant category in the cognitive field that the ‘interim solution’ [of 
using race as a proxy for some other trait of interest] can leave its own 
indelible mark . . . .”155 That is, race is such a freighted category that, 
 
 152. Kate Crawford, The Anxieties of Big Data, NEW INQUIRY (May 30, 2014), 
https://thenewinquiry.com/the-anxieties-of-big-data [https://perma.cc/25L7-4XUM]. 
 153. See Sarah Griffiths, Fighting a Losing Battle? AI ShotSpotter Computer Used To Track 
Gunfire Reveals Far More Shots Are Fired Than Are Ever Reported, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 19, 2016, 
9:10 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3547719/Fighting-losing-battle-AI-
ShotSpotter-computer-used-track-gunfire-reveals-far-shots-fired-reported.html [https://perma.cc 
/YPJ3-XGLX]. Another example is a predictive model that could be used by hospitals to forecast 
readmissions of patients with pneumonia risk, which corrects for a counterintuitive pattern in the 
training data caused by the admission of asthmatic patients directly to intensive care. See Rich 
Caruana et al., Intelligible Models for Healthcare: Predicting Pneumonia Risk and Hospital 30-
Day Readmission, 21 PROC. ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND 
DATA MINING 1721, 1725–27 (2015).  
 154. Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer, Does Machine Learning Automate Moral 
Hazard and Error?, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 476, 478 (2017).  
 155. Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 SCIENCE 1050, 1050 (2005); see also 
Alvin Rajkomar, Michaela Hardt, Michael D. Howell, Greg Corrado, & Marshall H. Chin, 
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once deployed, it cannot be taken back. Race effects can arise if data 
collected as a byproduct of police activity does “not pertain to future 
instances of crime” but rather to “instances of crime that become[] 
known to police.”156 That is, if police activity is predicted by race, then 
subsequent policing (and hence the costs of policing) will be unevenly 
allocated by race. The result is greater black exposure to arrest and 
incarceration.157 Again, it is worth flagging the possibility of technical 
solutions. The computer science literature demonstrates that such 
effects can be buffered by incorporating an element of randomization 
into the algorithm.158 
How forceful, as an empirical matter, are these concerns? One 
study of PredPol’s algorithm suggests ground for concern. According 
to that study, when the algorithm used police data to generate 
predictions of narcotics crimes in Oakland, the algorithm 
recommended that twice as much policing resources be directed to 
black areas as white areas, despite that narcotics offenses were 
reasonably equally spread across both white and black areas.159 A 
second study, also focused on the PredPol algorithm, identified the 
possibility of “runaway feedback loops,” by which police are 
repeatedly sent back to the same neighborhood in a way that reinforces 
and exacerbates initial distortions in the training data.160 Third, a recent 
 
Ensuring Fairness in Machine Learning to Advance Health Equity, ANN. INTERNAL MED. 866, 
870 (2018) (enumerating potential sources of bias in medical delivery). 
 156. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at 16 
(emphasis omitted).  
 157. For findings that race, rather than criminality alone, was an indirect factor in deployment 
in one city (Seattle), see Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop, Lori Pfingst & Melissa Bowen, Drug 
Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 
435 (2005). See also Huq, Disparate Policing, supra note 5, at 2429–40 (discussing effects of such 
disproportionate allocations of policing resources).  
 158. Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 682–83. But see Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for 
Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 195 (2017) (“[W]hen a model produces biased 
outcomes due to the processes generating the input values, merely tweaking the distribution of 
data inputs will not solve the problem.”). 
 159. Lum & Isaac, supra note 156, at 18 fig.2. The background estimate of the geographic 
distribution of narcotics offenses derives from separate national data. A survey of Los Angeles 
residents by the advocacy group Stop LAPD Spying Coalition similarly found police contact 
highly concentrated in less than two percent of the population and suggested that this flowed from 
the use of algorithmically derived “Chronic Offender Bulletins.” Maha Ahmed, Aided by 
Palantir, The LAPD Uses Predictive Policing to Monitor Specific People and Neighborhoods, 
INTERCEPT (May 11, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/11/predictive-policing-
surveillance-los-angeles/ [https://perma.cc/9H9Q-Z2Q4]. 
 160. DANIELLE ENSIGN, SORELLE A. FRIEDLER, SCOTT NEVILLE, CARLOS SCHEIDEGGER, 
SURESH VENKATASUBRAMANIAN, RUNAWAY FEEDBACK LOOPS IN PREDICTIVE POLICING 11–
12 (Sorelle A. Friedler & Christo Wilson eds., 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847 
HUQ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:10 PM 
2019] ALGORITHMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1079 
qualitative study of predictive policing in Los Angeles concluded that 
PredPol increases surveillance of low-income minority residents who 
are already under surveillance, widens the surveillance dragnet 
unequally, and drives members of the aforementioned communities to 
“avoid[] surveilling institutions.”161 These studies suggest that PredPol 
and similar technologies indeed distort the optimal allocation of 
policing resources. In part, this is because coercive resources will be 
inefficiently allocated. It may also happen because the individuals 
being regulated react to PredPol-driven interventions in different 
ways. For example, some engage in more avoidance behavior than 
others, leaving police resources concentrated on a small minority. 
Error rates across the population as a result of such variable 
responsiveness to new police intervention will consequently be 
uneven.162 
Companies marketing algorithmic criminal justice instruments 
have evinced varying levels of concern about this possibility of racial 
effects as a result of biased training data. On the one hand, PredPol’s 
manufacturer advertises its exclusion of “drug related offenses and 
traffic citation data from its predictions to remove officer bias.”163 
Similarly, HunchLab underscores its reliance on non-crime-related 
data as a way of shielding predictions from the influence of potentially 
flawed past exercises of officer discretion.164 On the other hand, the 
Sentencing Commission of Pennsylvania has incorporated arrest data 
into its sentencing algorithm, despite there being good reason to think 
that police discretion as to when and whom to arrest may have racial 
distortions.165 How easy the problem is to fix without abandoning 
algorithmic prediction depends, of course, on the availability of 
unbiased substitute training data. 
Finally, concerns about the polluting effect of historical training 
data are not limited to predictive algorithms. Studies of facial 
recognition technologies also suggest racial disparities in accuracy 
 
[https://perma.cc/JF4D-MWN2]. 
 161. Brayne, supra note 65, at 999.  
 162. For an account of the difference between prediction problems and causal inference 
problems, and the risks of confusing the two, see Athey, supra note 33.  
 163. Machine Learning and Policing, PREDPOL BLOG (July 19, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
http://blog.predpol.com/machine-learning-and-policing [https://perma.cc/39PV-XXE6]. 
 164. See AZAVEA, supra note 109, at 12 (“Our belief is that the use of non-crime data sets as 
variables within a crime prediction system is important, because variables based solely upon crime 
data become skewed as predictions are used operationally.”).  
 165. Barry-Jester et al., supra note 143.  
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rates. One 2012 study tested three commercial algorithms on mug shots 
from Pinellas County, Florida. African Americans were between five 
and ten percent less likely to be successfully identified—that is, more 
likely to be falsely rejected—than other demographic groups. It 
identified a similar decline for females relative to males and for 
younger subjects relative to older subjects.166 A measure of caution, 
though, should be used in evaluating these studies. Much has changed 
in the domain of machine and deep learning since 2012.167 It cannot be 
assumed that limitations on computational instruments that existed 
then still hinder analogous tools today. 
2. Bail/Sentencing Predictions and the Problem of Distorting 
Feature Selection.  The problems with algorithmic criminal justice do 
not begin and end with a concern about tainted historical training data. 
Attention to the bail and sentencing context suggests that even when 
there is no allegation of tainted training data, algorithmic criminal 
justice can generate concerns related to racial equity as a consequence 
of feature selection decisions. Even if these concerns focus on arguably 
unanticipated results, they might nonetheless have empirically 
consequential magnitudes. 
Perhaps the highest profile debate concerning the racial effects of 
algorithmic instruments in criminal justice, though, has focused on the 
COMPAS algorithm. To recapitulate the facts: Analyzing COMPAS 
data from Broward County, Florida, ProPublica observed that the 
algorithm was “likely to falsely flag black defendants as future 
criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as 
white defendants,” and to mislabel white defendants as “low risk more 
often than black defendants.”168 That is, conditional on being a 
nonrisky type, the COMPAS algorithm is more likely to overstate the 
risk presented by a black person than a white person. Northpointe’s 
 
 166. Brendan F. Klare, Mark J. Burge, Joshua C. Klontz, Richard W. Vorder Bruegge & Anil 
K. Jain, Face Recognition Performance: Role of Demographic Information, 7 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1789, 1797 tbl.II, 1800 (2012); cf. P. 
Jonathon Phillips, Fang Jiang, Abhijit Narvekar, Julianne Ayyad & Alice J. O’Toole, An Other-
Race Effect for Face Recognition Algorithms, 8 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON APPLIED PERCEPTION 
14:1, 14:5 (2011) (finding race-specific bias in algorithms primarily designed for East Asian and 
Caucasian facial identification).  
 167. A particularly vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the quality of machine 
translation tools. See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec., 
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KUM9-XPJW] (describing the increase in quality of machine-learning translation). 
 168. Angwin et al., supra note 16. 
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response did not focus on this measure of false positives (or, 
correlatively, the measure of false negatives that list in favor of whites). 
Instead, it identified the pool of individuals assigned a certain risk score 
as the relevant pool of comparators and showed that, within that pool, 
white and black defendants were equally likely to recidivate.169 The 
ratio it emphasized, that is, takes as a denominator the group identified 
as high risk within each racial group and then asks how many of those 
identifications are erroneous. This is the rate of false positives 
conditional on being identified as a risky type. The resulting debate 
might well be understood not in terms of whether the COMPAS 
algorithm is racially discriminatory—after all, there is no dispute that 
the algorithm did not include race as a feature—but rather what kind 
of racial effects count in a normative or legal evaluation of its 
performance.170 
COMPAS’s use in criminal sentencing has been challenged on 
various constitutional grounds. But its race-related effects remain 
untested in court. The most extensive judicial treatment of COMPAS, 
offered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Loomis,171 involved 
a criminal defendant’s due process claim that he was entitled to know 
how the algorithm calculated his risk score.172 Rejecting a challenge to 
the way in which the algorithm accounts for a suspect’s gender, the 
Wisconsin Court noted “concerns regarding how a COMPAS 
assessment’s risk factors correlate with race.”173 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not connect that observation with either a legal theory 
pursuant to which such correlations might be objectionable or, 
alternatively, a normative basis for concern notwithstanding legality. 
Otherwise, commentators have noted that actuarial sentencing tools, 
whether algorithmic or not, might have more or less disparate racial 
impact or “inequitable social consequences.”174 But precisely what 
these “consequences” might be remains unclear. 
 
 169. Dieterich et al., supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 170. See Feller et al., supra note 22 (observing that algorithmic fairness should also entail an 
inquiry into the effects of that algorithm).  
 171. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wisc. 2016). 
 172. Id. at 761–62 (holding that because the algorithm employed only publicly available data, 
or data that a defendant has supplied, the defendant could have denied or explained any 
information that was employed to develop his risk score). It is worth noting that the court’s 
analysis here misses the force of the defendant’s argument. The  latter seemed to object not so 
much to the nondisclosure of information about his own circumstances but to the manner in which 
that information was evaluated and weighted by the COMPAS algorithm.  
 173. Id. at 763. 
 174. Monahan & Skeem, supra note 144, at 507. For an empirical study that renders these 
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Nevertheless, the COMPAS debate suggests that concerns about 
racial equity can persist even if the inputs to the algorithm are not tainted 
by any historical bias. Part of my aim here, particularly in Part III, is to 
explain how this can be so. For now, it suffices to say that earlier 
commentators who have suggested that algorithmic bias can be 
addressed exclusively through “a transparency of inputs and outputs” 
may have captured only one part of a larger normative picture.175 
3. Conclusion: An Incomplete Evidentiary Record.  Race interacts 
with algorithmic criminal justice tools in one of three ways. First, racial 
animus or stereotypical thinking can infect and distort training data. 
Second, race may be a feature used for classification. Third, the 
classification rule may have predictable effects that seem asymmetrical 
between racial groups. Scholars’ thinking about and responses to the 
racial effects of algorithmic criminal justice instruments have been ad 
hoc and unsystematic. We have, at best, fragments of a broader account 
of how such effects arise and their consequences. Hence, empirically 
understanding the manner in which algorithmic tools redistribute 
coercive outcomes should remain an important focus of research. Still, 
even with limited evidence in hand, it seems reasonable to think about 
the appropriate normative framework for evaluating these 
instruments’ racial effects—especially given the long and troubled 
interaction between criminal justice policy and widely held beliefs 
about racial differences in culture and behavior. 
The conceptual tools for that investigation are plainly wanting at 
the moment. There is no general agreement on the ways in which racial 
effects might count against the adoption or continued use of an 
algorithm. Insufficient attention, moreover, has been paid to the 
difference between tainted training data and problematic feature 
selection. There is also no general understanding of what it means to 
say that feature selection is flawed. Nor is there any consideration of 
how different kinds of racial effects might be weighed against each 
other. The field is ripe, in short, for more careful theorization of what 
it precisely means to talk about racial equity in algorithmic criminal 
justice. 
 
concepts with more precision, see Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, 
and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 702–03 (2016) 
(analyzing the relation of the Post Conviction Risk Assessment tool and future arrests, finding 
that scores tracked the same level of recidivism within each group). 
 175. Chander, supra note 43, at 1039 (emphasis omitted). 
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II.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND ALGORITHMIC JUSTICE 
But is such theorization needed? The Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, after all, purports to provide a general 
norm regulating the state’s use of race. Perhaps constitutional equality 
jurisprudence provides the needful criterion for evaluating the race 
effects of algorithmic criminal justice. 
Or perhaps not. I describe and apply in this Part conventional 
doctrinal norms under the Equal Protection Clause. The core takeaway 
is that the dominant intent- and classification-focused calibration is ill 
suited to the forms and dynamics of algorithmic criminal justice tools. 
To be sure, one might choose to apply the litmus tests supplied in the 
jurisprudence. But given that these focus on qualities of state action 
that are irrelevant, or barely relevant, to the way that algorithms in 
practice work, it is hard to see why one would do so. If there is a lesson 
here, it is about the woeful inadequacy of our constitutional equality 
norms for the contemporary world. 
A. What Equal Protection Protects 
Equal protection doctrine imposes two fundamental prohibitions 
on governmental action touching on race.176 One concerns formal racial 
classifications. The other pertains to racialized intentions. In contrast, 
the Court has either rejected or ignored concerns about the illegitimate 
nature or delegitimizing consequences of raw racial disparities in 
criminal justice. 
Almost since its inception, constitutional equal protection has 
been understood to prohibit most laws containing an explicit racial 
classification as well as laws that assign rights or burdens based on 
racial classifications.177 The first major judicial interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, Strauder v. West Virginia,178 concerned a state 
statute limiting jury service to “white male persons . . . twenty-one 
years of age.”179 Invalidating the conviction of an African American 
man by an all-white jury, the Court explained that the statute’s want of 
 
 176. Concerns about racial equity in criminal law need not be expressed in terms of equal 
protection jurisprudence. Many cases formally concerning due process arose in the context of 
discriminatory law enforcement and are plausibly understood in terms of the Court’s desire to 
constrain the latter’s discretion. My concern in this Part is the formal doctrinal specification of 
equality, not its potential jurisprudential substitutes. 
 177. A leading exception is Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
 178. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 179. Id. at 305 (citation omitted).  
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facial equality violated the Constitution’s guarantee of “immunity from 
inequality of legal protection.”180 Racial classifications today are not 
per se invalid. Rather, they now trigger searching judicial review of 
their tailoring and means-ends rationality, an inquiry known as “strict 
scrutiny.”181 
Notoriously, strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal.182 In Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin,183 for example, the Court upheld the 
University of Texas at Austin’s admission program, even though it 
accounted for race as one element of a “Personal Achievement Index,” 
or PAI.184 The latter satisfied strict scrutiny because the university 
“articulated concrete and precise goals” in relation to educational 
diversity, relied on “both statistical and anecdotal” evidence” of a need 
for affirmative action, and engaged in ongoing deliberation about 
admissions protocols.185 Precisely how Fisher calibrated strict scrutiny, 
though, is difficult to say. Educational diversity is not easily reduced to 
“concrete and precise” terms. Nothing the Court said illuminated how 
it tested the means-ends rationality behind the university’s actions.186 
Yet in other contexts, it has construed strict scrutiny to work a near-
categorical prohibition on similarly race-conscious government 
action.187 For instance, in an earlier capital habeas case, the Court made 
the errant suggestion that race is “totally irrelevant to the sentencing 
 
 180. Id. at 310. 
 181. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) 
(imposing such scrutiny whenever “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis 
of individual racial classifications”); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) 
(describing the use of such classifications as “pernicious” (citation omitted)); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a 
State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further 
that interest.”).  
 182. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.’”). 
 183. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 184. On the construction of the PAI, see Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 
304 (2013).  
 185. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2211–12.  
 186. David A. Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for Affirmative 
Action, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (“The central problem is that judgments about the kind and 
degree of diversity that a student body should have . . . are simply not susceptible to precise 
metrics.”).  
 187. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1302 (2007) 
(“According to one interpretation, strict scrutiny embodies a nearly categorical prohibition 
against infringements of fundamental rights, regardless of the government’s motivation, but 
subject to rare exceptions when the government can demonstrate that infringements are 
necessary to avoid highly serious, even catastrophic harms.”).  
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process.”188 Such evanescent dicta, however, are probably too frail to 
support any firm conclusion. 
Second, the Equal Protection Clause’s regulation of racial 
considerations extends to instances in which the state harms an 
individual because of “a racially discriminatory purpose.”189 This 
requires litigants to “show both that the passive enforcement system 
had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.”190 The Court has not defined with precision 
what counts as a “racially discriminatory purpose.”191 But at a 
minimum, it seems to include naked, taste-based aversion to a group 
based exclusively on race.192 So the Court recently explained that 
evidence that a juror relied on “racial stereotypes or animus to convict 
a criminal defendant” would be sufficient to warrant reversal of that 
conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds.193 Even here, the doctrine is 
not without ambiguity. It is not clear, for instance, whether a state actor 
shown to have made a decision based on racial animus could plausibly 
respond that their action could nonetheless be upheld because it 
survived strict scrutiny. Analytically, it is hard to see how a measure 
based on an invidious stereotype could ever be closely fitted to a 
 
 188. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). 
 189. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that “the basic equal protection 
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately 
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). Racial intent must be the but-for cause of an 
action. Pers. Adm’r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (finding proof of discriminatory purpose 
requires showing that government decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group”).  
 190. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). 
 191. See Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 41, at 21–36 (describing five different theories 
of discriminatory purpose in the case law); accord David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the 
Taming of Brown, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 935, 947 (1989) (noting that even canonical cases such as 
Brown v. Board of Education did not clarify “which conception of discrimination [the Court] 
embraced, or how far the principle of [Equal Protection] extended”). 
 192. This is what economists call taste-based discrimination. GARY S. BECKER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14–15 (2d ed. 1971) (modeling taste-based discrimination as a 
“discrimination coefficient,” which “acts as a bridge between money and net costs. Suppose an 
employer were faced with the money wage rate π of a particular factor; he is assumed to act as if 
π(1 + di) were the net wage rate, with di as his [discrimination coefficient] against this factor” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 193. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 
S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016) (holding that the Georgia Supreme Court had made a “clearly 
erroneous” decision when it found that prosecution use of preemptory strikes in a capital case 
was not animated by a discriminatory purpose in the face of lurid evidence to the contrary). 
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compelling state interest. So it may be that the question does not arise 
because it has little operational importance.194 
Race can infiltrate the mind in forms other than animus. For 
example, a rational reliance on race as a statistically accurate proxy for 
some other policy-salient quality is analytically distinct from taste-
based discrimination.195 The Court has not been clear on whether such 
statistical discrimination triggers constitutional concerns. On the one 
hand, in the 2007 case Johnson v. California,196 a majority of the 
Justices held that strict scrutiny applied to an unwritten California 
prison policy of racially segregating prisoners for up to sixty days each 
time they enter a new correctional facility with the aim of mitigating 
violence between gangs of different races.197 On the other hand, lower 
federal courts routinely shake off challenges to race-specific suspect 
descriptions. The Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly 
declined to intervene to prevent the latter practice.198 All that can 
safely be said is that, at least in some instances, statistical 
discrimination will be subject to close judicial scrutiny, and sometimes 
it won’t be. The cut-point between those domains remains to be 
defined. 
Moreover, it seems likely that not all racial animus in the criminal 
justice system is crisply articulated in the Queen’s English. Instead, we 
might expect overt racial labelings to be the exception, with race more 
commonly embedded in “tacit,” unspoken understandings.199 The only 
evidence of the latter’s operation may be downstream differential 
 
 194. I am not sure, however, that this conclusion would be warranted. Consider, for example, 
an action shown to be tainted by racial animus but that could be defended as narrowly tailored 
given different motivational premises and additional evidentiary support. The so-called travel ban 
might have this character. For extended discussion, see Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 195. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “We Are All Different”: Statistical Discrimination and the 
Right To Be Treated as an Individual, 15 J. ETHICS 47, 54 (2011) (providing a formal definition of 
such rational discrimination). This is what economists call statistical discrimination; see Kenneth 
J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24–27 
(Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) (“Skin color and sex are cheap sources of 
information. Therefore prejudices (in the literal sense of pre-judgments, judgments made in 
advance of the evidence) about such differentia can be easily implemented.”). 
 196. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
 197. Id. at 503. 
 198. See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting race-based suspect selection from equal 
protection scrutiny); Brown v. City of Oneanta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
816 (2001) (same).  
 199. On the notion of tacit understandings, see Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Tacit Inference, 
41 PHILOSOPHY 1, 2–3 (1966). 
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effects on suspects and defendants of different races. In contrast to its 
strict superintendence of overt classifications, however, the Court has 
rejected the argument that a constitutional violation can be made out 
by a showing of disparate racial impact. In McCleskey v. Kemp,200 the 
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Georgia’s capital 
punishment system based on econometric evidence of racial 
disparities.201 Lower courts have extended that holding to the distinct 
context of statistical evidence about the role of race in a single decision-
maker’s actions over time (e.g., a single district attorney over a number 
of years).202 
Oddly, both the Court’s embrace of the racial-intent rule and its 
repudiation of a disparate-treatment rule have been justified by the 
need to maintain the criminal justice system in good working order. In 
McCleskey, Justice Powell’s majority opinion expressed alarm that the 
defendant’s challenge would “throw[] into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”203 In 
Powell’s view, it was inconceivable that the Constitution would 
“require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that 
correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a 
criminal justice system . . . .”204 On the other hand, the Court has 
explained decisions enforcing closer invigilation of race’s role in the 
jury deliberation context as “necessary to prevent a systemic loss of 
confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the 
Sixth Amendment trial right.”205 So the Court appears to believe that 
the legitimacy of a criminal justice system simultaneously requires keen 
alertness to concerns of racial justice and also a willful blindness to such 
concerns. 
Stated in summary form, then, current constitutional 
jurisprudence compels judges to maintain the stability of the criminal 
justice system by ignoring racial disparities, by isolating racial 
 
 200. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
 201. Id. at 292–93.  
 202. John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey Racial 
Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1794 (1998) (collecting cases); 
see also Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d. 612, 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no 
discriminatory purpose despite statistical showing of racial disparities in traffic stops). But cf. 
Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused To Accept Statistical Evidence of 
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp-and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1269, 1288 (2018) (flagging limits to McClesky’s scope). 
 203. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315. 
 204. Id. at 319.  
 205. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017). 
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classifications, and by extirpating (some) racial animus. It is a doctrinal 
status quo that poorly fits emergent algorithmic realities. 
B. How Equal Protection Fails to Speak in Algorithmic Terms 
Equal protection doctrine is sharply criticized by those who 
perceive it to embody a judicial failure to account for the diffusion and 
impact of racial effects in society, let alone our highly racially stratified 
criminal justice system.206 I set these concerns aside here (although I 
share them) and take the doctrine seriously on its own terms. Even 
then, I find reasons to doubt that the current doctrine can respond 
effectively to the questions of race raised by algorithmic criminal 
justice. The concerns of constitutional law simply do not map onto the 
ways in which race impinges on algorithmic criminal justice. The result 
is a gap between legal criteria and their objects. 
Crucially, the two main doctrinal touchstones of bad intent and 
bad classifications provide scant traction for the analysis of algorithmic 
criminal justice. Both hinge on concepts that translate poorly, if at all, 
to the algorithmic context and are not easily adapted for application to 
that end. A focus on racial animus will almost never be fruitful. A focus 
on classification leads to perverse and unjustified results. The 
replacement of unstructured discretion with algorithmic precision, 
therefore, thoroughly destabilizes how equal protection doctrine works 
on the ground. The resulting mismatches compel my conclusion that a 
new framework is needed for thinking about the pertinent racial equity 
questions. 
1. The Trouble with Intent.  Taking intent as a touchstone of equal 
protection directs attention to questions at best tangential to the 
potential role of race in algorithmic criminal justice. To be sure, 
problematic intent might enter into algorithmic design in different 
ways, one of which is easily accounted for in doctrinal terms. But, in 
general, intent will rarely be the crux of the matter. 
To begin, I suspect that the notion of machine intentionality is 
sufficiently counterintuitive to find no place in constitutional law. 
Speculation about a future of “superintelligent” artificial intelligences 
 
 206. Recent critiques include Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1779, 1828 (2012) (arguing that the Court has “split equal protection into the separate 
domains . . . one governing affirmative action and the other discrimination against non-Whites” 
in a move that has made it systematically easier for white plaintiffs to prevail) and Russell K. 
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (contending that “the Supreme 
Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection Clause in most respects”).  
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aside,207 the transformation of training data into new schemes of 
classification by machine learning or deep learning does not obviously 
map onto familiar forms of human intentionality. The most advanced 
artificial intelligences can now pass the Turing test208 and defeat 
(human) world champions at Go.209 But even these machines do not 
obviously possess the sort of psychological interiority commonly 
thought to be a necessary predicate to intentionality.210 Talk of machine 
intentionality, therefore, is either premature or a badly poised 
metaphor. It is better to treat the algorithm itself as irrelevant to the 
constitutional analysis so far as intentionality is concerned. 
Bracketing the machine-learning tool as agent, however, there are 
two possible ways in which intention might enter the picture. First, an 
algorithm’s designer might be motivated by either an animosity toward 
a racial group, or else a prior belief that race correlates with criminality, 
and then deliberately design the algorithm on that basis. Barocas and 
Selbst call this “masking.”211 Masking might occur through either a 
choice to use polluted training data or the deliberate selection of some 
features but not others on racial grounds. For instance, it is well 
understood that when employers ignore credit score information, they 
tend to search for proxies that have the inadvertent effect of deepening 
racial disparities.212 A discriminatory algorithm designer will leverage 
 
 207. Cf. NICK BOSTRAM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 52 (2014) 
(defining superintelligence as “intellects that greatly outperform the best human minds across 
many very general cognitive domains”).  
 208. In June 2014, an artificial intelligence passed the Turing test, arguably for the first time. 
Kevin Warwick & Huma Shah, Can Machines Think? A Report on Turing Test Experiments at the 
Royal Society, 28 J. EXP. & THEO. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 989, 990 (2016). The Turing test 
involves human judgments about natural language conversations between a computer and a 
machine; a machine passes the test if the human observer is unable to distinguish human from 
machine. Id. 
 209. Silver et al., supra note 90, at 490.  
 210. Accounts of this interiority vary. In one influential definition, intentions are “conduct-
controlling pro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain without reconsideration, and 
which play a significant role as inputs into reasoning . . . .” MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, 
PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 20 (1987). In another view, when S is doing A intentionally, S 
knows that she is doing A. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 11–15 (2d ed. 1963). Machines lack 
attitudes or self-knowledge in the relevant senses.  
 211. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 51, at 692 (“[D]ecision makers could knowingly and 
purposefully bias the collection of data to ensure that mining suggests rules that are less favorable 
to members of protected classes.”).  
 212. See Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Check Score”: Employer Credit 
Check Bans and Signal Substitution 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Research Dep’t Working 
Papers, No. 16-10, 2016), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/
wp1610.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQU6-6BVQ].  
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such knowledge to fashion instruments that yield the disparate racial 
effects they believe to be warranted a priori. Without knowing the full 
spectrum of features that could, conceivably, have been included in the 
training data—which can be “enormous”213—it will be difficult or 
impossible to diagnose this kind of conduct absent direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent.214 It will, moreover, be especially difficult to 
show that, but for race, a specific feature would or would not have been 
included, as the doctrine requires.215 A basic principle of “feature 
selection” instructs that one should keep the important features and 
discard the unimportant ones.216 To the extent that masking occurs, 
therefore, it seems clear that the litigation process would rarely yield 
evidence of such intentional manipulation of the algorithm’s design. 
Another reason to set aside the masking phenomenon, however, 
is the fact that it does not appear to be a significant one in practice. Part 
of the reason for this is that racial animus has a performative, 
interpersonal aspect. Racial discrimination commonly entails an effort 
by one group to “produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of 
another group,”217 correlatively producing a “set of . . . privileges[] and 
benefits” of superordinate group membership.218 Masking is a form of 
discrimination that involves no interpersonal interaction and no 
esteem-affirming performance. 
But polluted data may be used faute de mieux or due to ignorance. 
Imagine a jurisdiction where African Americans were targeted for 
frequent and unjustified police contact, such that the pool of arrestees 
and convicted criminals may be biased by an underrepresentation of 
nonblack individuals.219 Or consider a jurisdiction in which black 
 
 213. Athey, supra note 33, at 483.  
 214. Training data will often have so many potential features that inferring the reason for the 
inclusion of some and exclusion of others will often not be feasible. Id. at 483. 
 215. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (noting that proof of discriminatory 
purpose requires showing that a government decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group”).  
 216. ALPAYDIN, supra note 32, at 110. 
 217. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995). For a similar idea, 
see George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among Tradition-Oriented, 
Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 265 (1985). 
 218. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1993). For a 
seminal account of this concept, see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE 
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). 
 219. For findings of such disparities, see, for example, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 573–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reporting statistical racial disparities in arrest rates by New York 
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neighborhoods are underserved by police responses to emergency 
calls, which might, in contrast, generate data on the distribution of 
crime with a black (or grey) hole in respect to African American 
neighborhoods.220 The two hypotheticals can even be combined: A 
jurisdiction might underserve black neighborhoods by understaffing 
responses to 911 calls at the same time as concentrating a 
disproportionate amount of street policing resources on the same 
neighborhoods.221 An algorithm trained on police-generated data from 
any of these jurisdictions is likely to allocate resources in ways that 
reflect and perhaps entrench disparities in how policing resources are 
allocated. But police might adopt the algorithm without considering 
racial effects or with an honest but erroneous belief that their training 
data is untainted. 
The relevant intent in these examples, though, differs in two 
important ways from canonical instances of impermissible intent in 
equal protection case law. First, in the absence of an express policy, the 
use of racial preferences by officials in activities that produce training 
data will generally be highly decentralized and uncoordinated. Policing 
decisions, and to a lesser extent bail determinations and sentencing, are 
scattered rather than centralized forms of state action. Individual 
officers or magistrates have a large degree of discretion in consequence 
of their sheer numerosity and the difficulty of monitoring their 
decisions. It is hardly clear how a court could or would make a 
determination of joint intent when confronted with an extensive 
multitude ungoverned by formal decision-making procedures. 
Constitutional doctrine has not developed an intellectual toolkit for 
aggregating a large number of dispersed individual motives so as to 
ascertain whether a but-for standard of intentionality has been met by 
a collectivity. 
A similar problem arises in the legislative context, where many 
individuals bring to bear potentially diverse motives in order to shape 
 
police officers) and Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation 
(FIO) Study Results, BOS. POLICE DEP’T NEWS (Oct. 8, 2014), http://bpdnews.com/news/
2014/10/8/boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio-study-
results [https://perma.cc/7M4L-R3EG] (noting a similar disparity in Boston).  
 220. See, e.g., Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976, 979 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2013) (describing allegations of longer response times to 911 calls in minority 
neighborhoods in Chicago). 
 221. As appears to be the case with Chicago. See id.; Aamer Madhani, Chicago Police and 
ACLU Agree to Stop-and-Frisk Safeguards, USA TODAY, (Aug. 7, 2015, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/ 
31277041 [https://perma.cc/4PUT-V7S9].  
HUQ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:10 PM 
1092  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1043 
singular institutional acts with the force of law. Equal protection law 
has struggled with how to conceptualize the concept of intent in the 
legislative context so unsuccessfully that one influential commentator 
has advocated wholesale retreat from judicial accounting for 
legislators’ subjective intent. In his view, the task of principled 
aggregation is simply too hard for judges.222 Unlike legislatures, a 
plurality of geographically and temporally diffused cohorts of officials 
(whether police or magistrates) lack any stable procedures or 
mechanisms for eliciting and formalizing a singular intent.223 Their 
ability to form a coherent, let alone legally relevant, intent may 
seriously be doubted. 
Even if such an intentionality could be derived from a diffuse haze 
of discrete policing decisions or detention-related judgments, it is not 
clear whether the mere incorporation by reference of such historical 
judgments into new, forward-looking algorithmic tools would trigger 
equal protection concerns. Even if historical intent can be inferred 
successfully, there remains a question of whether reliance on flawed 
historical data counts as a constitutionally relevant form of intent. It is 
certainly possible for bad intent to endure over time. Indeed, the Court 
has invalidated state laws enacted to preserve “white supremacy” many 
decades before litigation began; in so doing, it rejected the notion that 
“events occurring in the [intervening] years [could have] legitimated 
the provision.”224 But there are no equal protection cases in which the 
Court has considered outcomes resulting from concededly 
discriminatory official action that in turn was adopted by a new and 
different actor as the rationale for forward-looking policy.225 In short, 
 
 222. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
523, 533–34 (2016) (“[U]ltimate determinations of constitutional validity should always depend 
on the content and effects of challenged legislation, not the subjective intentions of the enacting 
legislature . . . .”). 
 223. Cf. CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, 
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 81 (2012) (“[A] group’s performance as an agent depends 
on how it is organized: on its rules and procedures for forming its propositional attitudes . . . .”). 
In most cases, the groups relevant to algorithmic criminal justice have no such rules or procedures.  
 224. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 233 (1985). 
 225. The closest analog of which I am aware arises under the Fair Housing Act, where there 
can be a question whether a municipal decision on, say, taxes or zoning causes a pattern of 
residential racial segregation. Cf. Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (demanding a showing of “robust causality”). But the 
question here is not one of causation; it is a question of whether the intentions of the original 
police or magistrate ought to be imputed to the algorithm, given their influence on the training 
data.  
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there is simply no way of knowing whether a “relay-race” theory of bad 
intent would pass muster in constitutional law. 
Perhaps the closest analog to this problem of governmental 
reliance on flawed data arises in the Fourth Amendment context. In 
that domain, the Court has declined to treat the flaws in a first-moving 
official’s behavior as infecting a second, subsequently acting official’s 
decision to depend on that first officer. For example, when a police 
officer relies on a recalled warrant mistakenly distributed by another 
police force, the latter’s mistake of law is not imputed to the arresting 
officer such that evidence must be excluded.226 The analogy is 
inexact.227 But the Fourth Amendment’s stingy treatment of imputed 
fault suggests that an intent-focused equal protection lens will have 
limited traction in the algorithmic criminal justice context. 
Still, that theoretical problem may be precisely that—theoretical. 
Even if flawed training data were identified, it seems unlikely that its 
tainted nature could suffice to establish a constitutional concern in 
practice. Any moderately competent municipality found using flawed 
data would hardly concede that it was doing so intentionally. Rather, it 
would be far more likely to defend its decision as the best option given 
historically shaped constraints. Because a constitutional violation 
cannot be shown unless the state relied on race as a ground of decision, 
as opposed to acting in spite of race,228 this defense would likely 
succeed. As a practical matter, therefore, the narrow definition of 
intent in equal protection doctrine would likely insulate racially tainted 
training data from legal attack. 
This means that none of the pathways for integrating intent into 
the equal protection analysis of algorithmic criminal justice are likely 
to prove fruitful. None of them are well suited for a consideration of 
the ways in which race in practice interacts with algorithmic criminal 
justice. Equal protection doctrine was designed to police the dispersed, 
open-ended discretionary judgments of street-level officials. It does a 
 
 226. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
14–15 (1995) (acknowledging the same result for errors by a judicial administrator). The Court, 
however, is willing to impute another officer’s knowledge of information salient to the legality of 
a search when doing so renders a search lawful. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). 
Although these positions can be squared, it is striking that imputation is available only when it 
expands state authority.  
 227. The availability of exclusion in Fourth Amendment cases is said to turn on the deterrent 
effect of that remedy. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. The consequential focus on deterrence is absent 
when one is concerned with attributions of intentionality.  
 228. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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poor job when applied to the very different context of algorithm design 
and application. It is therefore necessary to consider the logic of 
anticlassification as an alternative lens. 
2. The Trouble with Classification.  The anticlassification strand of 
equal protection doctrine prohibits the government from “classify[ing] 
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden 
category” such as race.229 At first blush, it seems a natural fit: 
Algorithms work by applying categories to training data (when 
defining features) and then generating novel classification rules to 
apply to test data. A rule to the effect that race or ethnicity could not 
be used either as a feature or as an element of a classifier, absent 
narrow tailoring to a compelling state interest, would seem to be a 
natural fit. Such a rule, however, would be unmoored from the 
justifications for an anticlassificatory rule. It would also engender 
results that contradict the assumed purposes of the rule. 
The anticlassification account of equal protection is premised on 
two main justifications. First, it is motivated by a concern that the 
state’s use of racial classifications will facilitate or amplify private 
discrimination.230 This worry is premised on an empirical claim that a 
“perception . . . fostered by [government]” of differences between 
racial groups “can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial 
prejudice.”231 The foundation of this empirical claim is hardly clear. 
Why would the communicative effect of state racial classifications 
entail a legitimation of private animus? The causal link here is not 
obvious.232 One interpretation of the Court’s argument might start with 
the Court’s claim that race is “‘in most circumstances irrelevant’ to any 
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”233 Read 
 
 229. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003). 
 230. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (holding that a Louisiana statute, which 
mandated the designation of a candidate’s race on election ballots, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because it enlisted the power of the state to enforce private racial prejudices). 
 231. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (emphasis omitted). 
 232. It is not clear why the reasonable observer would draw an inference about a racial group, 
though, instead of an inference that the government was unjustified and irrational in its action. In 
any event, the claim that racial identity is not salient in a context where racial preferences retain 
a powerful hold is a deeply dubious one. For an estimate of the prevalence of racial animus using 
an innovative empirical method, see Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, The Cost of Racial Animus on a 
Black Candidate: Evidence Using Google Search Data, 118 J. PUB. ECON. 26, 26–28 (2014) (using 
Google data to estimate the prevalence and geographic variation of antiblack sentiment).  
 233. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). Notice that the Court’s argument here is crucially ambiguous. It could be 
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sympathetically, the Court appears to be saying that because race is 
irrelevant to the vindication of legitimate government ends, the 
observation that the state is treating race nevertheless as salient has the 
effect of propagating a false popular belief in racial hierarchies.234 The 
second possible interpretation of an anticlassification rule turns on a 
nonconsequentialist, deontological intuition. That is, according to 
some Justices, it is a moral axiom that the state must treat all persons 
as individuals, and such individualization precludes any taking account 
of their race.235 This moral demand for individuation entails demanding 
judicial scrutiny for all racial classifications. 
There are, to be sure, reasons for skepticism about these moral 
and theoretical premises of the anticlassification principle.236 But even 
 
that an individual’s race is irrelevant to many legitimate state ends but that the persistence of 
racism as an ambient social phenomenon is relevant to how the state can achieve those ends. The 
Court’s formulation elides this difference and therefore misses the possibility that racism may be 
salient to the state’s means-end rationality, even if race per se is not.  
 234. Fletcher A. Blanchard, Christian S. Crandall, John C. Brigham & Leigh Ann Vaughn, 
Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993, 993, 995–96 (1994) (demonstrating that cues from other people that 
racial discrimination is permissible or impermissible affect whether a person will condemn a racist 
remark, and that students hearing others condemn racism led to antiracist opinions while hearing 
others condone racism weakened antiracist opinions); Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman & 
Laurie O’Brien, Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for 
Internalization, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 359, 359 (2002) (finding that “[t]he public 
expression of prejudice toward 105 social groups was very highly correlated with social approval 
of that expression. Participants closely adhere to social norms when expressing prejudice, 
evaluating scenarios of discrimination, and reacting to hostile jokes”); Katie M. Duchscherer & 
John F. Dovidio, When Memes Are Mean: Appraisals of and Objections to Stereotypic Memes, 2 
TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCHOL. SCI. 335, 341 (2016) (describing an online experiment 
involving memes about Asian stereotypes in which “seeing another person object to the meme 
increased the likelihood that White participants would object . . . but only when the race of the 
person was unstated, and not when the person was Asian”). 
 235. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the heart 
of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must 
treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”). The same 
position is articulated with respect to gender in DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
168–69 (1999) (arguing that to treat a woman on the basis of “information that relates to the whole 
group or class” to which she belongs is “to fail to treat her respectfully as an individual, and 
potentially to commit an injustice”). This argument does not rest on empirical evidence of the 
stigmatizing consequences of race-based or gender-based action. Rather, it applies whether or not 
the classified individuals perceive themselves as aggrieved.  
 236. For devastating critiques of the idea of colorblindness, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE 
IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 155–79 (2010) (describing the concept as “confused” and 
“[i]ncoherent”); Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case 
of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (Robert Post 
& Michael Rogin eds., 1998); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color 
Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 81–83 
(2000). For an originalist critique of anticlassification rules as interpretations of the Equal 
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bracketing those hesitations, and taking those justifications at face 
value, there is still no reason to think that the logic of anticlassification 
strongly militates against the use of race either as a feature or as an 
element of a classifier by machine-learning tools. To the contrary, as a 
matter of either precedent or logic, equal protection law can 
accommodate racially sensitive algorithmic criminal justice. 
Consider the first concern about the communicative effect of 
racial classifications. It is not clear that an algorithmic classifier is the 
sort of racial criterion that courts perceive to be objectionable. Rather, 
it is somewhat akin to the explicit use of race in criminal suspect 
identifications, which has to date elicited scant constitutional 
concern.237 Suspect descriptions instead operate as given elements of 
the regulatory backdrop. Courts have not been wholly clear about why 
such suspect descriptions do not elicit careful scrutiny. One possible 
explanation is that judges believe suspect descriptions to be based on 
extrinsic facts, rather than airy suppositions about racial types, and so 
not the kind of generalizations that trigger anticlassificatory concerns. 
This logic might be extended to the algorithmic context. Race-based 
feature selections would then trigger no more constitutional concern 
than race-based suspect descriptions. The argument would be that a 
classifier based on training data is akin to a suspect description of a 
familiar sort, insofar as both are predicated on historical facts about 
crime.238 Indeed, an advocate of algorithmic criminal justice might note 
that human observers are more likely than a machine to err in their 
deployment of race as a signal of criminality than an algorithm.239 They 
 
Protection Clause, in favor of a “duty-to-protect” view, see Christopher R. Green, The Original 
Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 3 
(2008). 
 237. For a collection of cases, see R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and 
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1095–96 (2001). 
Note that this is not a function of the inclusion of other considerations. Classifications that include 
race as one among many elements can run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. See Balkin & 
Siegel, supra note 229, at 16–17 (noting conflicting precedent on this point).  
 238. Are algorithms different because the historical data upon which they are based is not 
specifically linked to a particular crime? Consider the decision in Brown v. City of Oneonta, for 
example, which declined to impose constitutional tort liability when a description of a black male 
suspect provoked Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non-white persons,” including 
women, encountered on the streets. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted). Although the stops 
were, in a trivial sense, based on a historical fact, the connection between that fact and the 
subsequent police actions was very strained. Id. The same might be said of algorithmic tools.  
 239. See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions, supra note 136, at 277 tbl.VII (making 
precisely this argument).  
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might further contend that it is perverse to object to efforts to mitigate 
the effects of race on criminal justice outcomes through the 
substitution of machine for human judgments. 
A second reason to think that an anticlassificatory logic does not 
work well in this domain would focus upon the absence of any 
communicative effect from algorithmic criminal justice. Many of the 
algorithms discussed in Part I are sheltered from disclosure by trade 
secrets law and hence are not disclosed presently to the public.240 Even 
if they were to be disclosed in the course of litigation, it would likely be 
under the auspices of a protective order. To the extent that 
anticlassification rules rest on a concern about the communicative 
effects of state action, the use of an algorithmic tool that is wholly 
opaque should mitigate those concerns. More generally, the Supreme 
Court has been more accommodating of the conceded state use of race 
when it is somewhat obscured from public view.241 A state actor that 
relies upon an algorithmic tool, but that muffles the precise content of 
that tool from the public through trade secrets law or otherwise, might 
mitigate the most powerful challenges on equal protection grounds. 
Stated more positively, the much-maligned algorithmic quality of 
“opacity” has the benefit of dampening troublesome communicative 
effects for racial classification. Advocacy of transparency has the 
perverse effect of courting the expressive harms that equal protection 
tries to minimize. 
A related, if somewhat subtler, question arises if race is employed 
as a feature of the training data—that is, for each discrete observation 
(individual) in the training data, race is recorded—but race plays no 
role in the labels used to describe the classification task or in the tools 
used to identify an appropriate function. Does that approach have a 
constitutionally impermissible communicative effect? 
Northpointe omitted race from the training data used for 
COMPAS.242 But this appears to reflect corporate risk aversion, not an 
effort at legal compliance. Current law does not address whether the 
availability of race as an input into the deliberative process that results 
 
 240. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1349–53 (2018) (collecting examples and arguing 
for more transparency). More generally, algorithms used by commercial actors are also “secret.” 
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2014). 
 241. See Strauss, supra note 186, at 24 (noting “the Court’s insistence on nontransparency” in 
affirmative action cases).  
 242. Angwin et al., supra note 16. 
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in state action violates the Equal Protection Clause on 
anticlassification grounds. To be sure, there is language in earlier 
precedent that suggests that any racial trace in official deliberation 
raises a constitutional problem.243 But the weight of precedential 
evidence (as well as common sense) suggests that the mere fact that a 
decision-maker can observe the race of subjects does not mean that 
resulting action is therefore invalid. As a practical matter, many front-
line state officials encounter suspects, defendants, and citizens and 
thereby directly perceive their interlocutors’ race.244 Similarly, the 
federal judiciary must—and indeed does—routinely recognize the race 
of litigants in order to reach judgments on statutory and constitutional 
discrimination claims, even when it is not strictly necessary.245 Finally, 
recent affirmative action jurisprudence implies (without expressly 
stating) that the bare fact of racial awareness is not sufficient to state a 
constitutional violation. The University of Texas, whose admission 
policy was reviewed and upheld by the Court in 2016, considered race 
as part of its PAI, and this alone did not suffice to generate a 
constitutional problem.246 In short, it seems quite plausible that an 
algorithmic criminal justice tool can use race as a feature in training 
data without triggering constitutional concern. 
What of the argument against the state’s use of racial 
classifications based on its putative obligation to treat individuals as 
individuals rather than as members of groups? The moral logic of 
individuation trains on “intentional uses” of racial classifications, not 
merely coincidental or happenstance entanglements with race.247 That 
logic might seem to have traction here since algorithmic criminal 
justice entails a decision-maker relying on group membership rather 
than accounting for all relevant characteristics of an individual. 
 
 243. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
 244. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471 (2004) (“For a half-century 
now, the Constitution has prohibited state action that classifies on the basis of race, yet as 
Americans have debated the implications of that principle, few have thought it barred collecting 
racial data.”).  
 245. Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 408 (2012) (documenting 
courts’ “unsettled and unsettling approach” to the recognition of litigants’ racial identities). 
 246. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206, 2212 (2016) (“[R]ace is given 
weight as a subfactor within the PAI.”).  
 247. ANDERSON, supra note 236, at 155. Anderson is discussing “racial preferences” here, but 
her point applies to racial classifications too. Id.  
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But this is not quite right. In the absence of masking,248 there is no 
human decision to assign costs or benefits on the basis of a racial 
classification with algorithmic criminal justice. And race is generally 
not going to be used as a substitute for more fine-grained traits. In any 
case, merely withholding race information does not ensure that an 
algorithm will not point toward race as a salient proxy. Machine-
learning algorithms take training data (with or without a race 
parameter) and use them to generate a new classifier, which can then 
be applied to test data.249 The fact that an algorithm is not initially 
supplied with an impermissible ground of decision as a feature of 
training data does not mean that it will not end up tracking that 
criterion in its classifier. Machine-learning tools are powerful and 
useful precisely because they can detect regularities in a data set that 
would not manifest in the absence of computational tools. Although 
machine-learning tools can be designed to be “private,” in the sense of 
eschewing reliance on certain traits,250 they can also “help to pinpoint 
reliable proxies” for traits even without information about the 
distribution of such traits in the population.251 If race emerges as part 
of the classifier, this is not an intentional action in any meaningful 
sense—and yet it is still a classification on the basis of race. 
Even if that happens, the official deploying the algorithm cannot 
be faulted for failing to engage in sufficient individuation: She supplies 
granular training data, selects among different computational tools, 
and then applies these tools to the specific facts about the individual 
being classified.252 Even if the training data includes race information, 
the official has not designated race as a salient trait in any meaningful 
way. A decision-making process in which no human actor has elected 
to employ race as a criterion of action is not fairly characterized as an 
instance in which “the government distributes burdens or benefits on 
the basis of individual racial classifications.”253 The argument against 
 
 248. See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text.  
 249. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.  
 250. Cynthia Dwork & Aaron Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, 9 
FOUND. & TRENDS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. 211, 216–18 (2014) (developing a related 
concept of differential privacy). 
 251. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 51, at 692–93.  
 252. Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 682 (noting that in machine learning, “decision rules evolve 
on the fly—they are not specified directly, but are inferred from the data”).  
 253. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) 
(emphasis added). What if the government actor designing the algorithm fails to prevent the 
algorithm from homing in on race? I read the doctrine not to problematize such culpable 
omissions.  
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algorithmic criminal justice from the moral demand for individuation, 
therefore, fails. 
There is one final argument for the inapplicability of 
anticlassification logic here. Race is commonly thought to be already 
highly correlated with socioeconomic characteristics related to 
criminogenic and victimization distributions. It might hence be 
reasonably anticipated that many algorithmic tools designed to be 
predictive of criminality will, even absent any race feature in the 
training data, generate a function that either mimics, or is a good 
approximation of, racial distributions in the population. Given this, it 
is possible that “by remaining blind to sensitive attributes, a 
classification rule can select exactly the opposite of what is 
intended.”254 That is, the absence of a de facto predictive trait from the 
training data can generate systematic and serious errors in prediction. 
A simple example from outside the machine-learning context 
illustrates this possibility. Imagine that wearing a particular baseball 
cap is used by police as a proxy for drug possession (say, because it may 
signal gang membership). Both blacks and whites wear this cap. For 
100 percent of whites, and for zero percent of blacks, the cap is an 
accurate signal of drug possession. Let us say that police stop all those 
encountered wearing the cap, and this population is 75 percent white 
and 25 percent black. Because the cap generates a 75 percent success 
rate, its categorical (and colorblind) use might be deemed a 
meritorious criterion. But the efficacy of searches, and the avoidance 
of needless hassle for minorities, can be increased by limiting the 
instrument to white suspects.255 Colorblindness here generates 
substantial and avoidable social costs. These can be corrected by simply 
accounting for race.256  
In the machine-learning context, a fix entails the creation of a 
predictive tool that assigns individuals from different demographics to 
different classifications even though they exhibit the same behavioral 
traits.257 Lest this seem obviously beyond the legal and moral pale, 
consider that one study of probation and parole decisions found that, 
 
 254. Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 686. 
 255. This example is drawn from Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police 
Practices, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 131, 139 (2002). 
 256. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
918 (2017); Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, 
Fairness Through Awareness, 3 INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. CONF. 214, 218–20 
(2012) (demonstrating this result formally).  
 257. For a parallel result using the COMPAS data, see Nabi & Shpitser, supra note 20, at 8.  
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following the decision to omit race from a machine-learning algorithm, 
the accuracy of recidivism predictions declined “by about 7 percentage 
points.”258 The procedural purity demanded by an anticlassification 
rule, in sum, would come at a high price in terms of accuracy in 
algorithmic application.259 
3. The Lessons of Algorithmic Technology for Equal Protection 
Doctrine.  Current doctrinal approaches to constitutional racial 
equality arose after the Court had abandoned its early twentieth-
century interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as “a rationality 
test . . . invoked sporadically to strike down economic regulation.”260 
These approaches were configured in the context of judicial efforts to 
dismantle educational segregation in the Jim Crow South and then 
during a political backlash to the Civil Rights Movement.261 It was 
probably inevitable that the legal conception of racial discrimination as 
a matter of intention or classification would reflect judicial concern 
with the discretionary choices of the police officer, school board 
president, or state legislator—that is, the modal problems presented by 
mid-century civil rights law. 
The institutional context of equal protection, however, has 
changed. Today, perhaps the sharpest and most controversial questions 
of racial justice are presented in the criminal justice domain. There, the 
emergence of algorithmic tools present questions poorly fitted to the 
doctrinal templates of intention and classification. This loose fit arises 
because the ways in which race filters into individual officials’ 
discretionary criminal justice decisions are very different from the ways 
in which it can infuse algorithmic tools. Equal protection, as a result, 
poses questions that are simply not relevant to the operation of 
algorithmic criminal justice. It is a superseded legal technology, so far 
as algorithmic criminal justice goes. As more state power is channeled 
through algorithmic means, it will become increasingly obsolete. 
 
 258. Richard Berk, The Role of Race in Forecasts of Violent Crime, 1 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 
231, 235 (2009).  
 259. Could such a use of race be justified as a narrowly tailored response to a compelling state 
interest? It is hard to say how much gain in accuracy would be required to make this claim 
compelling. For a discussion of how hard it is make this judgment, see supra notes 184–88 and 
accompanying text.  
 260. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 216 (1991). 
 261. Id. at 217–18; see also 3 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 328–37 (2014) (considering the judicial forms of this backlash).  
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On the one hand, the manner in which algorithmic criminal justice 
unfolds generally means that are few opportunities for intentional 
discrimination of the familiar kind. The process of feature selection, to 
be sure, creates opportunities to use race as an input, to intentionally 
omit race in order to generate discriminatory patterns, or to choose an 
insufficient number of variables in ways that mimic the same effect.262 
But this sort of masking will be very hard to discover, much as 
prosecutorial or judicial animus is hard to identify now. It does not, at 
least on the basis of current evidence, appear to be a significant 
problem. 
On the other hand, the logic of anticlassification might first seem 
to provide a firm foundation for regulating algorithmic criminal justice. 
But that logic turns out also to be a bad fit. The use of race in criminal 
justice algorithms is akin to the use of race in suspect descriptions. It 
lacks both the intentionality and the expressive spillovers that render 
nonindividuation troubling. Just as in the context of race-based suspect 
descriptions, moreover, it will sometimes be necessary to use race to 
achieve substantively accurate policy results. 
In the dialogue between equal protection and algorithmic criminal 
justice, I suspect that constitutional law has much to learn and little to 
teach. A set of tools developed for a regulatory world of dispersed state 
actors, occasionally motivated by naked animus, cannot be 
mechanically translated into a world of centralized, computational 
decision-making. Even after law has made its contribution, therefore, 
the question of racial equity in algorithmic criminal justice remains 
open for debate—while the relevance and moral acuity of equality 
jurisprudence should be viewed as in serious doubt, absent more 
intensive rethinking. 
III.  RACIAL EQUITY IN ALGORITHMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE BEYOND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The failure of constitutional law to provide a meaningful 
benchmark of racial equality is important in its own right. Yet it leaves 
the study of algorithmic criminal justice unmoored. It means there is 
no normatively attractive, empirically tractable way of evaluating the 
race effects of big-data predictive tools. This Part fills that gap. In order 
to do so, I will start by offering my own account of the normative stakes 
of racial equity in criminal justice to fill the vacuum left by our deficient 
 
 262. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 51, at 692; Kroll et al., supra note 39, at 681. 
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constitutional doctrine. My view is that the reason for concern about 
racial equity in criminal justice generally is that our policing and 
adjudicative institutions play significant roles in the reproduction and 
entrenchment of social stratification. In a racially segmented society, 
when a person’s life chances are defined importantly by their race, I 
believe this to be a moral wrong. 
With that normative benchmark in hand, I turn to the extensive 
computer science literature on the question. That scholarship has 
developed a series of definitions of what is alternatively defined as 
algorithmic fairness or algorithmic discrimination. The literature has 
focused first on precise mathematical formulations of each definition 
and second on the generation of impossibility theorems—that is, 
formal proofs that it is not possible to maximize two or more 
parameters that in some fashion measure the racial effects of an 
algorithm. Because the computer science literature has been “silent on 
the choice” between different understandings of fairness,263 mere 
specification of alternative conceptions of racial equity is not sufficient 
for any tractable conclusions about public policy. By applying my 
account of racial equity in criminal justice to these standards, I aim to 
make progress on determining which technical conception captures 
something of normative significance. 
Two caveats are useful here. First, for the sake of clarity of 
exposition, I focus here on a binary between white and black 
defendants, even though this obscures the more complex racial 
dynamics of American policing today.264 A focus on a black-white 
binary is warranted here as a way of clarifying the fundamental 
conceptual stakes. It is obviously inadequate as a general account of 
racial equity in policing, and I do not intend it as such. Moreover, I 
should emphasize again that my aim here is to offer not a judgment in 
respect to any specific algorithm but a more general analytic approach. 
 
 263. Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth, Fairness 
in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art 29 (May 30, 2017) [hereinafter Berk et 
al., Fairness in Criminal Justice], https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK9Q-
VVNG]; see also Sorelle A. Friedler, Carlos Scheidegger & Suresh Venkatasubramanian, On the 
(Im)possibility of Fairness 12 (Sept. 23, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07236.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQ59-3V37] (asserting that “[c]hoice in mechanism [i.e., feature design] must 
thus be tied to an explicit choice in worldview”—in particular, a choice to prioritize either 
individual or group fairness).  
 264. Cf. Ramiro Martínez, Jr., Incorporating Latinos and Immigrants into Policing Research, 
6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 57, 57 (2007) (documenting the “lack of research on Latino/as 
and Latino groups” in relation to the criminal justice system). 
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Much depends on the particular costs and benefits that in situ flow 
from a given instrument. 
Second, a racial equity analysis of algorithmic criminal justice 
should not be a comparative one. It is not sufficient, that is, to point to 
a superseded technology that relies upon flawed human discretion and 
that already generates large racial effects as a justification for new, 
slightly less flawed technologies for allocating coercion. The mere fact 
that the status quo ante is characterized by racial injustice does not 
legitimatize proposals that preserve or extend some substantial part of 
that injustice. For example, no one thinks (or should think) the Jim 
Crow regime laudable merely because it followed slavery. 
Improvements in the status quo are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for racial equity to be satisfied. It seems likely that the shift 
to algorithmic tools in criminal justice will be an enduring one. At the 
moment that a new policy is introduced, with potential path-dependent 
effects that will unfold over many iterations of policy making, it is 
especially important to understand the conditions under which that 
policy promotes racial equity: Far better, that is, to embed that 
principle at a policy’s inception than to attend years of damage that 
cannot ever wholly be unraveled. Each technology ought to be 
evaluated on its merits and in light of its consequences. 
A. The Stakes of Racial Equity in Contemporary American Criminal 
Justice 
Why care about racial equity in criminal law? Without an answer 
to that question—and we have already seen that constitutional law 
doesn’t provide a convincing one—no analysis of algorithmic criminal 
justice’s racial equity effects gets off the ground. Accordingly, I start by 
offering my own evaluation of the racial stakes of criminal justice. But 
in doing so, I do not intend to break new ground here. I rather aim to 
clearly set forth a distinct normative position respecting racial equity 
in the criminal justice context. 
American criminal justice implicates racial equity concerns 
because of their dynamic effects on racial stratification. Historical and 
contemporary empirical evidence suggests that both in the past and the 
present, criminal justice has been invoked in public discourse and 
applied in state practice so as to predictably exacerbate the subordinate 
status of African Americans in general. The dynamic (re)production of 
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iniquitous social stratification—beyond the bare facts of animus and 
classification—is what should grip our collective conscience.265 
At a very high level of abstraction, four causal mechanisms link 
criminal justice institutions to racial stratification. First, inherent black 
criminality has been invoked for more than a hundred years as public 
justification for more punitive interventions against African 
Americans and for the withholding of social services from them on 
moral desert grounds. Second, black communities have in practice been 
both overpoliced (in the sense of subjected to higher rates of coercive 
interventions) and also underprotected (in the sense of not receiving 
the same measure of protective legal resources that nonblack 
communities receive). As a result of this inefficient allocation of 
policing resources, state coercion has not resulted in lower levels of 
private coercion for African Americans. Third, pivotal actors within 
the criminal justice system, such as police, prosecutors, judges, and 
even public defenders, have tended to treat black suspects and 
defendants more harshly than white ones. Hence, the per capita cost of 
crime suppression has been greater for blacks than whites. Fourth, the 
spillover effects from disparate policing for black families and 
communities appear to be larger in magnitude than the spillover effects 
in white communities, even controlling for the extent of coercion. The 
net result of these mechanisms is that criminal justice imposes 
“compounding”266 disadvantage upon African Americans as a group 
and works as a brake on individuals’ efforts to rise in the social 
hierarchy. Even if not all African Americans are impeded by this 
headwind, enough are that we can meaningfully talk of persisting racial 
stratification to which criminal justice institutions have contributed. 
These diverse causal pathways underpin the need for careful attention 
to the manner in which formal criminal justice institutions can 
undermine the status of African Americans as a group. 
 
 265. Racial stratification is objectionable on (at least) two grounds. First, it embodies what 
Tim Scanlon calls a manifest “failure of equal concern” on the part of the state. T.M. SCANLON, 
WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? 8 (2018). Second, stratification generates deadweight welfare 
losses in the form of unused human capital, psychological and social harms, and violence that 
flows from the latter. Of course, to the extent that such dynamic consequences have normative 
salience, it is because of a predicate obligation of equal concern toward the disadvantaged.  
 266. I draw this term from Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty To Avoid 
Compounding Injustice, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 107 (Hugh 
Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018). Hellman’s use of the term assumes an original act of 
discrimination; my use does not (although discriminatory acts are woven across the operation of 
criminal justice).  
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Rather than offering normative and empirical justifications for 
each element of this position—a task that would require a book rather 
than an article—I sketch some suggestive evidence for these causal 
linkages between criminal justice and racial stratification. I start with 
history, although I do not want to suggest that the state’s obligations 
here rest on its historical responsibility for creating racial stratification 
in the first instance rather than its role in perpetuating that condition. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, national public 
discourse about “law and order became racialized, and conviction and 
incarceration rates for African Americans jumped 
disproportionately.”267 As the leading historical work by Khalil Gibran 
Muhammad vividly demonstrates, Progressive-era academics, 
journalists, and politicians in the North linked crime to African 
Americans at the same time as they downplayed white ethnic groups 
as sources of crime. By the early 1940s, Muhammad explains, “‘Black’ 
stood as the unmitigated signifier of deviation (and deviance) from the 
normative category of ‘White.’”268 Concomitant to this rhetorical shift, 
urban policing and carceral resources were disproportionately 
allocated to African Americans who were in the process of migrating 
up from the rural South. In northern cities in particular, police singled 
out blacks for intense surveillance and coercion.269 This pushed up the 
rate of black incarceration and the proportion of the prison population 
that was black.270 The black share of that population never 
subsequently dropped.271 Racialized mass incarceration, that is, was at 
its inception a product of a moral panic stoked by northern elites in 
respect to the growing presence of an African American population 
that previously had been the South’s “problem.” 
Today, racial disparities characterize both victimization rates and 
exposure to criminal justice coercion. Black men are more likely than 
white men to be victims of serious crimes (commonly called index 
crimes) such as murder.272 They are also more likely to be arrested and 
 
 267. Jeffrey S. Adler, Less Crime, More Punishment: Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice in 
Early Twentieth-Century America, 102 J. AM. HIST. 34, 34 (2015). 
 268. MUHAMMAD, supra note 3, at 13.  
 269. Christopher Muller, Northward Migration and the Rise of Racial Disparity in American 
Incarceration, 1880–1950, 118 AM. J. SOC. 281, 310 (2012). 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id.  
 272. BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, THE ECONOMICS OF RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 333–34 
(2015). 
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incarcerated than white peers.273 In many urban contexts, blacks and 
whites also experience widely varying chances of being stopped by 
police.274 Moving from the policing to the adjudicative phase of the 
criminal justice process, common sentencing regimes impose disparate 
treatment on similarly situated offenders of different races by the use 
of different penalty structures for behavior closely associated with 
different racial groups.275 As a result, one in eight black men in their 
twenties is in prison or jail on any given day, while some 69 percent of 
black high school dropouts are imprisoned over their lifetime, 
compared with just 15 percent of white high school dropouts.276 For 
young black men, therefore, prison has thus become a predictable part 
of life’s course.277 
Note also that the intensive concentration of policing and 
incarceration resources along racial lines is not a rational, cost-justified 
response to crime. As I have argued elsewhere, there is evidence that 
some of the most common forms of policing black communities are 
inefficacious.278 Black incarceration rates are also too high to be 
plausibly justified. One estimate suggests that reducing incarceration 
rates from 2009 to 1984 levels, and investing the resulting savings in an 
increased police presence, would lead to a net decline in violent crime 
nationally of about 130,000 incidents per annum.279 Therefore, even if 
racial minorities benefit from the public safety produced by the 
criminal justice system, it is at a highly disproportionate and 
unnecessary direct cost. 
Is part of this burden, though, justified by higher black crime 
rates? Even if we assume that “African Americans engage in 
 
 273. Id. at 335–36. 
 274. Huq, Disparate Policing, supra note 5, at 2411–12 (summarizing data from Chicago and 
New York). 
 275. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 
1303 (1995) (describing the use of racially charged language in the enactment of narcotics statutes 
that impose different sentences on crack and powder cocaine offenses). 
 276. See Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 
621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 231 (2009); Bruce Western & Christopher Muller, 
Mass Incarceration, Macrosociology, and the Poor, 647 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 
166, 166–67 (2013).  
 277. For an extended account of these effects, see Kristin Henning, Boys to Men: The Role of 
Policing in the Socialization of Black Boys, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, 
PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 57 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017).  
 278. Huq, Disparate Policing, supra note 5, at 2429–40.  
 279. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Economical Crime Control, in CONTROLLING CRIME: 
STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 1, 32 n.20 (Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Justin McCrary eds., 
2011).  
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significantly higher rates of street crime,” there is evidence that 
conditions of “racial segregation and concentrated disadvantage”—
environmental conditions that themselves are a function of non-race-
neutral policies—explain much of the difference between different 
racial groups’ crime rates.280 That is, it is not so much that race is 
causally related to criminality but that African Americans are subject 
to forms of social and economic stratification and segmentation that 
conduce to criminality. Paradoxically, these underlying conditions are 
in an important respect a function of the federal government’s decision 
to shift resources away from building human and social capital to 
policing crime. The intensification of policing and incarceration since 
the early 1970s, the historian Elizabeth Hinton has argued, was a 
conscious, and racially tinged, policy substitute for Great Society 
programs that could have mitigated those conditions.281 That 
substitution could be reversed. As the sociologist Patrick Sharkey has 
demonstrated, it is precisely the local recreation of social services, and 
the concomitant creation of social capital, that has been a leading 
contributor to recent declines in crime. In one empirical study, Sharkey 
and his colleagues thus estimated that “the addition of 10 community 
nonprofits per 100,000 residents leads to a 9 percent decline in the 
murder rate, a 6 percent decline in the violent crime rate, and a 4 
percent decline in the property crime rate.”282 
Finally, the direct costs of black incarceration are only part of the 
distinctive burden imposed by the current criminal justice system on 
racial minorities. Current crime suppression also imposes considerable 
collateral costs (or externalities) asymmetrically on racial minorities. 
To begin with, the immediate cost of encounters with police is racially 
asymmetric. The black experience of a police stop is reliably correlated 
with “stigma and stress responses and depressive symptoms”283 because 
 
 280. Callie Harbin Burt, Ronald L. Simons & Frederick X. Gibbons, Racial Discrimination, 
Ethnic-Racial Socialization, and Crime: A Micro-Sociological Model of Risk and Resilience, 77 
AM. SOC. REV. 648, 650–52 (2012); see also Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, The Structural 
Context of Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in Process, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 556 
(2000) (examining marginal effects of social advantage of black and white communities). 
 281. Elizabeth Hinton, “A War Within Our Own Boundaries”: Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 101–02 (2015). 
 282. Patrick Sharkey, Gerard Torrats-Espinosa & Delaram Takyar, Community and the 
Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime, 82. AM. SOC. REV. 1214, 
1234 (2017).  
 283. Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler & Bruce G. Link, Aggressive Policing and the 
Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321 (2014). For a powerful 
account of why these costs accrue distinctly to racial minorities, see Nicholas K. Peart, Why Is the 
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of the historically fraught nature of relations between American police 
and racial minorities. African Americans are, moreover, commonly 
subject to policing measures that are not generally employed against 
white citizens—such as pretextual vehicular stops—and are quite 
aware that they are objects of disparate treatment based on the 
presumption of black criminality.284 They are also quite aware of the 
stigmatizing connection between race and criminality drawn since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Even today, “demography-based 
suspicion is among the key social facts that define American life in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.”285 Ethnographic studies 
paint a bleak picture: interactions between police and young black men 
are marked by distrust and fear, fomenting widespread alienation and 
disaffection.286 Against the background of this broadly shared 
supposition of the relationship between criminality and race, public 
encounters with police can, even if warranted, humiliate and rob 
innocent racial minorities of the “ability to present themselves to other 
groups as the ordinary people they are.”287 
These effects generate further negative spillovers. As Randall 
Kennedy cogently observed three decades ago, African American men 
experience a “racial tax” from American criminal justice systems—
even if they have no contact with it—because police and citizens are 
prone to perceive their race as a proxy for criminality and, hence, to 
configure them as potential criminals rather than potential victims.288 
Recent empirical work has confirmed Kennedy’s account of the 
externalities of criminal justice for minority groups as a whole. African 
 
N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/ 
opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html [https://perma.cc/FB4R-7NN2]. 
 284. CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED 
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 117–18 (2014). 
 285. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22 (2011).  
 286. Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African American Young Men’s 
Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 85 (2007) (finding that street 
stops that are perceived as unfair create perceptions of the police as unjust among young black 
men); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A 
Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 266 (2010) 
(noting that many respondents described contact with police “as demeaning and of inordinate 
frequency”). 
 287. Paul Bou-Habib, Racial Profiling and Background Injustice, 15 J. ETHICS 33, 44 (2010). 
Bou-Habib addresses profiling, but I am extending his point.  
 288. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 158–60. The criminal justice system thus creates “shared 
categories and classification systems through which individuals perceive and make sense of their 
environment.” Michèle Lamont, Stefan Beljean & Matthew Clair, What Is Missing? Cultural 
Processes and Causal Pathways to Inequality, 12 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 573, 574 (2014). 
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American men hence continue to receive disfavored treatment in a 
wide array of economic and social contexts that limit important life 
opportunities.289 The increased risk of contact with police, and thus 
incarceration, undermines the economic and social resources available 
to the larger racial cohort embedded in the same geographic 
community.290 One in four black children also experiences parental 
incarceration—an experience that directly and negatively impacts their 
health and education outcomes.291 Most notably, and dismayingly, 
black parental incarceration is associated with a 49 percent increase in 
infant mortality, an increase that has no parallel among white families 
affected by incarceration.292 So not even children are spared. Rather, a 
concentration of policing and incarceration within black communities 
generates distinctive burdens with no parallel for majority racial 
groups—burdens that diffuse and concatenate across communities and 
generations. It is on this basis, I think, that it is plausible to characterize 
the contemporary American criminal justice system as “a systemic and 
institutional phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and the 
presumption of black and brown criminality.”293 
This account of racial equity in criminal justice does not hinge on 
the presence of discriminatory animus at any specific point in policing 
or the adjudicative process. Of course, disparate racial treatment 
happens—probably quite often.294 But this account of racial equity is 
forward looking and consequentialist insofar as it is trained on the ways 
in which systems reproduce practical socioeconomic stratification over 
time. Moreover, this account suggests that criminal justice institutions 
are not presently socially efficient. Their footprint could be diminished 
 
 289. For an effective summary of the relevant data, see Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The 
Sociology of Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 181 (2008); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN 
AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 93–96 (2007) (reporting effects of racialized assumptions of 
criminality on employment opportunities). 
 290. See Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 CRIME 
& JUST. 97, 115–16 (2008) (discussing this effect); see also Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, 
Staying Out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 204 (2014) (finding in a study of New York that “witnessing stops that occur 
with little justification and that feature physical force can make people feel occupied and 
powerless, and can incentivize disengagement with government”). 
 291. WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 8, at 41, 146 (noting that parental incarceration 
is a mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of inequality). 
 292. Id. at 108. 
 293. Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure 
of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 695, 701 (2010). 
 294. See generally supra notes 4–6. 
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in ways that do not create social costs from more crime. At present, 
however, the inefficiently large costs of criminal justice (which are not 
justified by sufficient offsetting social benefits) fall disproportionately 
on racial minorities. Many reforms that increase social efficiency will 
also further racial equity as a result. 
A possible counterargument is that a particular quantum of state 
coercion will, ceteris paribus, be more costly for a member of a white 
majority than a black minority. That is, whites’ greater wealth and 
more remunerative employment outcomes mean that their economic 
losses from even transient coercion or incapacitation are likely to be 
greater than those of African Americans.295 I am skeptical. I find it 
troubling to use racial stratification by wealth and income as a lever to 
discount the costs imposed on African Americans. I also do not accept 
that the implicit metric at work in this analysis (in effect, the capacity 
to pay) tracks a normatively attractive species of welfare. Finally, I 
have already flagged negative externalities to African Americans as a 
group, and to communities and families, that simply have no parallel 
for racial majorities. I think it is more likely that black communities 
and families will want for the social and financial buffers that mitigate 
the shock of criminal justice contacts. Hence, I think this 
counterargument is both empirically and normatively flawed. 
B. A Racial Equity Principle for (Algorithmic) Criminal Justice 
The algorithmic tools described in Part I are new mechanisms to 
allocate coercion within the criminal justice system. But the 
introduction of new computational and epistemic technologies does 
not alter the basic stakes of racial equity. They should be evaluated, 
that is, as elements of that overall system. 
In this light, the key question for racial equity is whether the costs 
that an algorithmically driven policy imposes upon a minority group 
outweigh the benefits accruing to that group. If an algorithmic tool 
generates public security by imposing greater costs (net of benefits) for 
blacks as a group, it raises a racial equity concern. That policy 
undermines racial equity by deepening the causal effect of the criminal 
justice system on race-based social stratification.296 This test is 
 
 295. Cedric Herring & Loren Henderson, Wealth Inequality in Black and White: Cultural and 
Structural Sources of the Racial Wealth Gap, 8 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 4, 4–5 (2016). 
 296. This standard is analytically distinct from disparate impact as conventionally understood, 
not least because it does not account for the benefits of a policy for those beyond the burdened 
group. It is an interesting question whether disparate impact, especially as applied to state action, 
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consequentialist. It focuses on the effects of an algorithm’s use.297 It is 
also holistic. Unlike older risk assessment tools, it accounts for both the 
benefits and the costs of intervention. And, to emphasize again, it is 
quite general: There is no reason not to apply it to criminal justice more 
generally. I develop the test here nevertheless because I am concerned 
with algorithmic tools that can develop precise cut-points for using 
coercion based on analyses of large volumes data. 
This standard has a distant kinship to John Rawls’s difference 
principle, which holds that “[a]ll differences in wealth and income . . . 
should work for the good of the least favored.”298 But the principle 
offered here operates within a much narrower institutional bore 
(criminal justice alone) and is justified on much more specific 
grounds—to ensure that institutions purportedly operating in 
furtherance of public safety are not doing so in a fashion that 
exacerbates differences in racial strata. 
What, though, of animus? Of course, individual officials do act at 
times with an invidious state of mind.299 At present, the institutional 
process of adjudication and the doctrines structuring inquiries into bad 
intent ensure that few such instances are ever brought to light, let alone 
used as a basis for constitutional relief.300 I am skeptical that the 
resulting harms are of the same magnitude as the damage that comes 
from criminal justice’s effect on racial stratification. Even if equal 
protection doctrine were more effective at identifying instances of bad 
motivation, a criminal justice system purged of animus would still have 
substantial ramifications for racial stratification. It is the existence of 
racial stratification, in any case, and the channeling of anxieties about 
security and difference into racialized forms, that plausibly drive much 
animus in the first instance. Addressing stratification, in my view, is a 
more enduring and effective means of regulating animus than the 
 
might be reconfigured to approach the standard suggested in the text. 
 297. Note that it is possible to take the view that there is a nonconsequentialist obligation on 
the state’s part to show equal regard for all its citizens, and to think that my consequentialist 
metric is a way of honoring that obligation.  
 298. JOHN RAWLS, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, in COLLECTED PAPERS 163 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls formulated the difference principle in a number of different ways. 
Nothing here rests on those variations, so I ignore them.  
 299. For evidence of that effect, see CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & 
DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 117–18 (2014). 
 300. For an extended argument to this effect, see Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 41, 
at 21–36. 
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emaciated and enfeebled investigative doctrinal instruments the Court 
employs.301 
There are two ways of analyzing the relevant costs and benefits of 
an algorithmically allocated coercive measure. The first is to focus 
solely on the immediate costs and benefits of a coercive intervention 
and to ignore externalities. As a rough cut, this seems a plausible 
approach with serious crimes, where externalities are dwarfed by 
immediate costs and benefits. An alternative approach accounts for 
both immediate costs and also externalities for different groups. The 
latter take many forms, including the effect of high incarceration rates 
on black communities and children as well as the social signification of 
race as a marker of criminality. But as I argued above, the evidence 
suggests that these impacts are felt principally by members of racial 
minorities. It is, moreover, plausible to hypothesize that these spillover 
costs will largely be experienced by members of the same racial group 
as the suspect, given persisting patterns of racial residential 
segregation.302 Hence, the spillover costs of coercion of minority 
individuals for the minority group will be greater on a per capita basis 
than the costs of coercing majority group members. If the costs of 
coercing minorities are larger while benefits remain static, racial justice 
will be satisfied by an algorithmic tool that imposes a higher threshold 
for black suspects than for white suspects. For less serious crimes—
again, defined very roughly—these spillover effects may be similar in 
magnitude to the direct benefits and costs of coercion. Hence, a 
simplified analysis that ignores spillovers would be inappropriate. 
Rather, a bifurcated rule with different thresholds for whites and 
blacks may be necessary to ensure that minority coercion does not 
exacerbate racial stratification for less serious offenses. 
Under either of these approaches, it will often be the case that 
racial equity and social efficiency (in the sense of ensuring that 
immediate social benefits exceed immediate social costs) will align. For 
example, when a majority group does not benefit from a policy, or 
when its net gain is less than the costs imposed on the minority group—
and the latter suffers a net loss—that policy is socially inefficient. 
Equity and efficiency therefore align. 
 
 301. Id.  
 302. Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder & Amy Spring, Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic 
Transitions, and Residential Segregation, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 527 (2015) (“[T]he modal 
experience for blacks (and Hispanics) in U.S. cities is high residential segregation.”). 
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This approach makes certain simplifying assumptions that I 
believe to be plausible. It assumes that most crime is intraracial, such 
that costs and benefits do not cross the color line by and large. 
Obviously, this is not always true. But it does hold as a general 
matter.303 Moreover, my analysis assumes away a number of unusual 
circumstances in which racial equity and social efficiency come apart. 
Because these circumstances are rare, I do not dwell on them. I 
mention two here briefly. First, it is possible that a policy benefits both 
the minority and the majority group, but the former benefit less than 
the latter. As a result of this gap, the extent of racial stratification 
increases even as the minority is benefited. The evaluation of such a 
policy would turn, in my view, on the magnitude of social gain and the 
extent to which the policy generates stratification. I do not think a 
general conclusion is appropriate to reject such policies. Rather, I 
believe the best approach would be not to discontinue the policy but to 
consider offsetting policies that mitigate its stratifying effect. 
Second, net gains from a policy for a majority group may exceed 
the net cost imposed on a minority group. Imagine, for example, a 
national security policy that generates significant benefits by imposing 
crushing burdens on a very small ethnic or religious minority. In this 
case, there is a tension between efficiency and antidiscrimination. Such 
conflicts have generated disagreement among scholars.304 In the crime-
control context, I suspect that this will rarely occur given the intragroup 
nature of much crime. Yet my own view is that gains in net social 
welfare should generally not be obtained by imposing burdens on 
minority groups subject to wider dynamics of compounding 
subordination.305 In effect, such a policy would yield a regressive wealth 
 
 303. See Robert M. O’Brien, The Interracial Nature of Violent Crimes: A Reexamination, 92 
AM. J. SOC. 817, 818–19 (1987) (finding evidence that crime is more intraracial than would be 
anticipated). 
 304. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? 
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 821, 821–35 (2000) (favoring welfare maximization), with Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. 
McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1129, 1170 
(2016) (doubting this maxim).  
 305. This view implies that consequences are morally salient but that welfare maximization is 
not the only measure of such consequences. The basic arrangements of a society are also 
important and sometimes merit protection or improvement even at the cost of net social welfare. 
For a different view that turns solely on purpose, and seems unconcerned with consequences, see 
Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 440–41 (1997) (“A law whose express 
purpose is racial apartheid or expulsion is unconstitutional per se, because racial purification of 
society is an objective that no legislature can pursue under the Fourteenth Amendment—
period.”).  
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transfer from blacks to whites in which the former pay for the security 
enjoyed by the latter.306 I would hence prioritize the distribution that 
resulted from a policy over the sheer quantity of social welfare it 
yielded, at least in the absence of catastrophic general welfare losses 
from forbearance. I do not perceive any circumstances in which that 
latter exception plausibly applies.307 
C. Benchmarks for Algorithmic Discrimination 
A large computer science literature on algorithmic design has 
generated a plethora of definitions of “algorithmic fairness” and 
“algorithmic discrimination.” One count finds twenty-one 
definitions.308 Not all are relevant in the criminal justice context, and 
not every concept is analytically distinct from all others. My aim in this 
section is to home in upon a relevant subset of such definitions and to 
develop a quadripartite taxonomy of potential metrics for gauging 
racial equity. Stated otherwise, what follows is a synthesis and 
simplification of a much larger technical literature—a synthesis written 
with the aim of practical application in mind. 
I begin by sketching the four most salient metrics in the 
literature.309 These can be summarized as follows: One might first 
 
 306. Cf. Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map To 
Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 4 SCI., TECH., & 
HUM. VALUES 118, 123 (2016) (noting the possibility that an algorithm can “enable[] transfers 
that systematically harm minorities and other protected groups”).  
 307. Minority politicians and police chiefs have at times believed that a disproportionate 
policing focus on African Americans was warranted in terms of community self-preservation—a 
belief that the “cumulative impact” of harsh antinarcotics measures has over time shown to be 
erroneous. JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 124–48, 21 (2017) (documenting these calls). If they had been correct—and Forman 
persuasively suggests that they were wrong on the facts—then this would have justified a less 
demanding risk threshold for blacks than for whites. See id. 
 308. See Arvind Narayan, Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Politics, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIXIuYdnyyk [https://perma.cc/HE3C-
GXDU]. 
 309. There are different enumerations of competing definitions of algorithmic fairness in 
criminal justice in particular. Richard Berk and his co-authors identify six different definitions. 
Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 13. They do not include one of the 
definitions I consider. Another paper by Sam Corbett-Davies and colleagues (including me) 
identifies three definitions that are salient to criminal justice policy. Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma 
Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel & Aziz Huq, Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of 
Fairness, in PROC. OF THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & 
DATA MINING 798 (2017). In addition, Feldman et al. define fairness as the inability to predict a 
trait from the execution of an algorithmic function. Michael Feldman, Sorelle A. Friedler, John 
Moeller, Carlos Scheidegger & Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Certifying and Removing Disparate 
Impact, in PROC. OF THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & 
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simply look at whether equal fractions of each racial group are labeled 
as risky, such that they will be subject to additional policing or 
detention. A similar, although not identical, analysis where risk is 
measured as a continuous variable without a threshold for coercive 
action would look for equal average risk scores across different racial 
groups. Second, one might ask whether the same classification rule is 
being used to assign racial groups to the high-risk category. This 
condition is satisfied if the same numerical risk score is used as a cutoff 
for all groups. Third, one might separate each racial group and then 
look at the rate of false positives conditional on being categorized as 
high risk. And fourth, one might separate each racial group and ask 
how frequently false positives are conditional on being in fact a 
nonrisky person. In the literature, this has been characterized as 
defining the population of those within a racial group who in fact will 
not engage in subsequent criminal conduct and identifying what 
proportion of that subset were erroneously categorized as warranting 
coercion. 
The four concepts of fairness or nondiscrimination are 
summarized in Table 1, which pairs each conception to the relevant 
parameter (or variable) that is to be equalized. 
 
Table 1: Conceptions of Nondiscrimination in Algorithmic Criminal 
Justice 
 
Conception of Fairness  Parameter that should be 
equalized  
Statistical parity  Proportion of each group subject 
to coercion 
Single threshold  Treatment of equally risky 
persons within each group 
Equally precise coercion  
Proportion of those ranked as 
risky who are erroneously 
classified 
Predictive error equality  
Proportion of nonrecidivist 
persons that are subject to 
coercion 
 
 
DATA MINING 265 (2015). 
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Table 1 is intended to capture the range of core conceptions of 
nondiscrimination that should matter in the criminal justice context. It 
does not, as I have already noted, capture the full range of potential 
conceptions of algorithmic fairness. For instance, one recent survey 
additionally flags the idea of treatment equality,310 which looks simply 
at the ratio of false positives to false negatives for a given racial group. 
To date, however, the latter concept has not played a large role in 
debates about racial equity. My analysis does not suggest that it should. 
Hence, I leave it to one side for present purposes. 
Figure 1 below helps clarify these four concepts. It displays the risk 
ranking assigned by an algorithm—represented as a continuous 
variable of two groups, white and black. The x-axis represents the risk 
value assigned to members of the population; the y-axis represents the 
frequency with which members of the group are assigned to a risk level. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that the training data used 
to generate the risk assessments is not flawed. I also assume that it is 
not biased in ways that result in whites or blacks being subject to 
disproportionate coercion. I make this assumption so as to enable a 
narrow focus on the question whether the algorithmic classification 
rule standing on its own presents a question of racial justice. 
The graphic contains a vertical line to represent the cutoff point 
for the purposes of allocating coercion. Those who fall to the right of 
this threshold are subject to the coercive treatment (either a police stop 
or a detention-related intervention), while those who are to the left of 
the threshold are not subject to any coercion. The parts of the curve 
that represent populations that will be coerced (assuming the 
algorithm’s recommendations are followed) are represented with 
shaded blocks in the graphic. The proportion of the white and the black 
populations subject to coercion is a function of the area under the 
respective curve to the right of the threshold. 
This form of graphical representation has a number of advantages. 
It captures the way in which a threshold will distinguish between 
populations that are themselves quite internally varied in terms of their 
riskiness. It also reflects some key features of criminal justice 
algorithms in practice. In particular, it captures the fact that a decision 
must be made about who the marginal person on the risk curve is who 
should be detained. It also captures the intuition that the risk curves 
for different racial groups might diverge.311
 
 310. Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 14. 
 311. An alternative used in the literature is a confusion table, which is a two-by-two matrix 
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Figure 1: Hypothetical risk distributions for white and black populations 
 
 
 
 
 
that distributes individuals in terms of whether they ultimately committed acts justifying coercion 
and whether they were in fact coerced. See, e.g., Tom Fawcett, An Introduction to ROC Analysis, 
27 PATTERN RECOGNITION LETTERS 861, 862 (2006) (describing the use of confusion matrices). 
Confusion tables, however, do not capture all the information that an algorithm generates, such 
as the variance in risk values—and rely on knowledge that a decision-maker by construction does 
not know at the time the relevant decision has to be made, that is, whether a suspect or a 
defendant in fact will go on to commit a crime or impose a harm on others in the future. Confusion 
tables hence omit useful information while including information that cannot plausibly inform the 
decision whether to coerce or not. They are not good instruments for exploring algorithmic 
fairness, which is a standard that has to be applied at the moment the algorithm is used—not later, 
once new information about potential states of the world has become available.  
Moreover, confusion tables fail to distinguish the average subject of coercion from the 
marginal subject of coercion. For example, imagine a single decision rule (say, a risk threshold of 
10 percent) is applied to both a white and a black population. The white population comprises 
some with a 1 percent chance of carrying contraband and some with a 75 percent chance. The 
black population comprises some with a 1 percent chance, and some with a 50 percent chance. A 
confusion table draws attention to the fact that the proportion of stops that are false positives for 
the white group will be one-half that for the black group (i.e., 25 percent rather than 50 percent), 
but the table will not elucidate whether this is a function of (a) a biased decision rule or (b) a 
neutral and justified decision rule being applied to different distributions in the population. See 
Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-Marginality in 
Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193, 1194 (2017) (setting out this 
example); see also Ayres, supra note 255, at 131 (discussing the “strengths and weaknesses of 
using ‘outcome tests’ to assess racial disparities in police practices”). This confusion, ironically, is 
avoided by foregoing the use of confusion tables.  
Black 
White 
Risk   
Frequency   
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In Figure 1, the tails of the curve for the black population are to 
the right of those for the white population. This means that the 
algorithm tends to assign general higher risk values to black persons 
than white persons. If the risk distributions of both populations are 
equal, no interesting question of racial equity or discrimination would 
arise: White and black outcomes would not be distinct. This element of 
the hypothetical is not meant to imply that blacks in fact are more likely 
to commit crimes than whites. It is rather to present a situation that is 
plausible and that defines most sharply the questions of racial equity of 
interest here. 
The four conceptions of algorithmic fairness or algorithmic 
nondiscrimination can be elaborated as follows. First, an algorithmic 
classifier might exhibit statistical parity. This means that an equal 
proportion of members of each group are subject to coercion. In terms 
of the graphic, this means that the shaded areas under the white and 
the black curves to the right of the threshold are equal to each other.312 
This can happen, it is worth noting, even if there is wide variation in 
the ratio of false positives to true positives for whites and for blacks. 
Where there is no threshold, one might instead use the average risk 
score for a given group. A variant on statistical parity is “conditional 
statistical parity,” which requires that, having controlled for a “limited 
set of ‘legitimate’ risk factors, an equal proportion of defendants within 
each race group” are treated as risky.313 In practice, however, this 
definition is highly sensitive to what counts as a “legitimate” risk factor. 
Because my analysis does not assume an answer to the question of what 
counts as a legitimate risk factor, I put aside here the possibility of 
conditional statistical parity. 
Statistical parity is a clear and simple idea. Indeed, it is employed 
as part of the prima facie case in disparate impact analysis in 
employment discrimination law.314 Under longstanding administrative 
agency construction, a racial difference in selection rates of “less than 
four-fifths” is “generally” taken as evidence of “adverse impact.”315 On 
 
 312. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 798; see also Dwork et al., supra note 256, at 218 
(defining statistical parity in terms of the fact that “an individual observed a particular outcome 
provides no information as to whether the individual is a member of S or a member of T”).  
 313. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 798.  
 314. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977); Int’l Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). 
 315. Federal guidelines state: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or 
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded 
by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater 
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the other hand, there is no a priori reason why state coercion should be 
equally distributed among racial groups. To be sure, there is some 
evidence that at least for certain sorts of offenses, such as narcotics 
crimes, there are “no statistically significant differences” in offending 
rates for different racial and ethnic groups.316 But on the assumption 
that the algorithm’s training data are not flawed, the hypothetical 
would simply not capture such cases. 
Second, an algorithmic classifier might be viewed as fair if it 
treated two people who evinced the same ex ante evidence of risk, but 
differed by race, in the same way. The computer science literature has 
distinguished between a single threshold and “multiple race-specific 
thresholds.”317 A recent paper further offers a formal proof to the effect 
that the “immediate utility” of a decision rule—defined in terms of the 
immediate benefits of crime directly suppressed and direct costs of 
coercion (and ignoring externalities)—is typically optimized by 
maintaining a single threshold rule for coercion rather than having 
plural thresholds.318 That is, a social planner with an algorithmic tool 
that is trained on unbiased data would select a single risk threshold for 
both whites and blacks if she wished to optimize over the costs and 
benefits of crime control. This analysis of social welfare, however, does 
not answer the question of what necessarily furthers racial equity under 
all conditions. In particular, it is important to observe that the formal 
proof of optimality is limited to the immediate effects of an algorithmic 
tool. Racial stratification is plausibly understood to be a compounding 
effect of the latter concept rather than something captured by the 
former. 
This conception of fairness in algorithmic criminal justice has not 
so far attracted a distinctive label. Indeed, some accounts of 
discrimination in the algorithmic context simply do not cite this kind of 
fairness, preferring to focus on the relative frequency of false (or true) 
positives (or negatives) in the two racial groups.319 In other work, this 
 
than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact. 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586–87 (2009) (endorsing 
this four-fifths rule). 
 316. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26 (2013), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHr
esults2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J46Z-CQ4Y]. 
 317. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 797. 
 318. Id. at 799–802.  
 319. See, e.g., Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 13–15 (failing to 
HUQ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:10 PM 
2019] ALGORITHMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1121 
conception has been characterized simply as “fairness,”320 but that 
nomenclature is too vague to be helpful. I label this definition, 
therefore, the single threshold definition of algorithmic fairness. 
Graphically, the single threshold definition of fairness is represented 
by the fact that the vertical line that marks the threshold between 
coercion and its absence is in the same place for both racial groups. If 
the vertical thresholds were placed in different locations on the x-axis, 
there would be a group of individuals between the two thresholds who 
would present the same evaluated risk but would be treated differently 
solely on account of their race. 
A third conception of algorithmic nondiscrimination examines 
only the portion of the population that lies to the right of the risk 
threshold. In Figure 1, this comprises the shaded areas under the 
curves. These encompass parts of the white and black populations 
subject to coercion as a consequence of the algorithm’s 
recommendations. Not all of these recommendations, however, will be 
borne out by future events. In the bail context, for example, some 
fraction of those subject to state coercion would not have gone on to 
commit crimes that justified pretrial detention. They will, in other 
words, be false positives. One way of thinking about nondiscrimination 
is in terms of the false positive error rate conditional on being assigned 
state coercion by the algorithm—which can also be stated as 
P(nonrecidivist|high risk). So if a greater fraction of blacks stopped or 
detained turn out to be innocent in the relevant sense than the same 
fraction of nonrecidivist whites, then this would violate the third 
conception of fairness. Or, stated in yet another form, if the proportion 
of those false positives under the black curve to the right of the risk 
threshold is greater than the proportion of false positives under the 
white curve to the right of the threshold, then this conception of 
equality is violated.321 This notion is captured by a number of different 
terms in the computer science literature. A leading group of analysts 
label it “conditional use accuracy.”322 In my view, it is simplest to label 
it equally precise coercion because this conception is centrally 
 
mention this kind of fairness in a sixfold taxonomy).  
 320. See Dwork et al., supra note 256, at 215.  
 321. This conception is focused not on the absolute number of false positives but rather on 
the percentage of those subject to coercion within a racial group that would not have gone on to 
engage in socially undesirable behavior. It would be perverse to define fairness in terms of a 
parameter that is driven primarily by the relative size of the two groups under study. 
 322. Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 14.  
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concerned with the rate at which false positives occur conditional on 
the fact of being coerced.323 
Equally precise coercion played a role in the debate over the 
COMPAS algorithm.324 Responding to ProPublica’s allegations of 
racial disparity, Northpointe focused on the fact that the rate of error 
among the black and white groups subject to coercion was the same.325 
In effect, the Northpointe argument was that so long as equally precise 
coercion obtained, there was no discrimination problem. 
The fourth and final conception of fairness in the algorithmic 
context also focuses on false positives, but from a different angle. 
Rather than the subset subject to coercion, it focuses on the subset that 
would not go on to commit a crime or violent act. This subset of 
nonrecidivating persons is used as a denominator. For a numerator, it 
asks what fraction of that subpopulation is incorrectly subject to 
coercion. In the bail context, for example, this means asking whether 
“among defendants who would not have gone on to commit a violent 
crime if released, detention rates are equal across race groups.”326 In 
other words, conditional on being a nonrecidivist (in whatever sense of 
that term is relevant), the rate of erroneous false positives across racial 
groups does not vary—or P(high risk|nonrecidivist). This conception of 
equality is not easy to capture using Figure 1, since the baseline 
category of nonrecidivists are dispersed on both sides of the risk 
thresholds. In effect, it comprises a diffuse subset of whites and blacks 
who in fact would not commit actions that justify coercion. This 
conception of fairness requires that we look for the proportion of that 
nonrecidivist subset to the right of the risk threshold. If one racial 
group’s ratio is larger than the other’s, there is reason for concern 
under this theory. 
This conception has attracted a wide variety of labels, including 
“predictive equality,”327 “conditional procedure accuracy,”328 and 
“equalized odds.”329 Another group of analysts use the label “balance 
 
 323. “Precision” is the term used by machine-learning specialists, who perceive the term 
“accurate” to imply a normative judgment. I am grateful to Sharad Goel at Stanford School of 
Engineering for discussion of this point.  
 324. See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 325. DIETERICH ET AL., supra note 20, at 3. 
 326. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 798.  
 327. Id.  
 328. Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 13–14.  
 329. Moritz Hardt, Eric Price & Nathan Srebro, Equality of Opportunity in Supervised 
Learning, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 2 (2016), 
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for the positive class” for a related concept.330 Their paper also 
mentions the concept of “balance for the negative class” to capture the 
symmetrical idea that “the assignment of scores shouldn’t be 
systematically more inaccurate for negative instances in one group than 
the other.”331 Deviating from my own past usage,332 I will use the label 
predictive error equality here to capture the idea that what is at stake 
in this fourth definition of nondiscrimination is the notion that the 
burden placed on the nonrecidivist subset of each racial group should 
be the same. Predictive error equality is the focus of the ProPublica 
critique of the COMPAS algorithm: The journalistic organization 
demonstrated that the proportion of nonrecidivist black defendants 
recommended for detention by the COMPAS algorithm was 
substantially higher than the proportion of nonrecidivist white 
defendants subject to the same recommendation.333 In effect, 
ProPublica implicitly leveraged the intuition that what matters with an 
algorithm is what happens to the nonrecidivist subset. If the treatment 
of nonrecidivists varies across racial groups, ProPublica’s argument 
went, an algorithm could not be ranked as nondiscriminatory. 
D. Prioritizing Conceptions of Algorithmic Discrimination 
The range of possible ways to operationalize the quality of 
nondiscrimination in the algorithmic criminal justice context raises the 
question of how to evaluate and rank the four main competing 
conceptions. My aim in this section is twofold. First, I point to results 
in the technical literature that demonstrate the impossibility of 
pursuing all these conceptions of nondiscrimination simultaneously. 
Second, I offer my own normative account of which conception to 
prioritize. This account, detailed above, hinges on the minimization of 
costs net of benefits for the minority group. Contrary to both 
Northpointe and ProPublica, this contends that rates of false positives 
(whatever denominator is used) are not compelling normative 
 
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6373-equality-of-opportunity-in-supervised-learning [https:// 
perma.cc/9N8L-FTBD].  
 330. Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the 
Fair Determination of Risk Scores 4, 10 (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4K2-DL2H] (labeling this concept “[c]alibration within groups”).  
 331. Id. at 4. 
 332. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 798.  
 333. See Angwin et al., supra note 16 (finding that “[t]he formula was particularly likely to 
falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice 
the rate as white defendants”). 
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benchmarks. Instead, the analysis should focus on whether a minority 
risk threshold yields net costs or benefits for that group. Where there 
are no spillovers, it is likely that the same threshold will obtain for both 
minority and majority groups. Where there are large and asymmetric 
spillovers, both social efficiency and racial equity are served by 
different thresholds. 
1. Conflicts Between Algorithmic Fairness Definitons.  It would 
seem desirable to satisfy all these definitions of equality. At least at 
first blush, all capture colorable and important intuitions about the fair 
allocation of coercion. But matters are not so simple. It turns out that 
this is not possible in many cases—and not possible under conditions 
that are reasonably likely to occur in practice—for two reasons. 
First, it will generally be the case that statistical parity cannot be 
achieved using a single threshold. This is readily apparent from Figure 
1, which illustrates the case in which the risk distributions of racial 
groups vary. When this happens, it will always be the case that a single 
risk threshold will subject different proportions of each group to 
coercion. Hence, it is not possible—assuming differences in the 
distributions of risk between the two racial populations—to have both 
a single threshold and also statistical parity. 
Second, it is often also impossible to achieve both equally precise 
coercion and predictive error equality. This impossibility result holds 
under two conditions. First, base rates of criminality are different for 
the two racial groups. Second, there is no function that allows for 
“perfectly accurate classification” (a condition also known as 
“separation”).334 Under these conditions, one cannot have both 
equality in conditional use accuracy and equality in the false negative 
and false positive rates, where the latter term is simply conditional 
procedural accuracy.335 It is for this reason that assessments of the 
COMPAS algorithm have diverged. On the one hand, the original 
criticism of the algorithm focused on the difference in the rate of 
 
 334. Berk et al., supra note 263, at 18–19. For derivations of the same result, see Alexandra 
Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction 
Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 157 (2017); Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs, supra note 330, 
at 5–6. Under certain conditions, it is not possible to equalize conditional procedural accuracy 
between groups without establishing different thresholds for black and white classifications. 
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 802–03.  
 335. Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 263, at 14; Kleinberg et al., Inherent 
Trade-Offs, supra note 330, at 5.  
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conditional procedural errors for blacks and whites.336 On the other 
hand, the defenses of Northpointe’s instrument focused on the fact that 
it was calibrated within the categories of risk—that is, the conditional 
use error rate was equal for both whites and blacks.337 Neither side 
recognized that given the possibility of underlying differences in the 
empirical characteristics of racial groups, and absent separation, these 
two metrics of algorithmic fairness were bound, mathematically, to 
diverge under plausible conditions.338 
A choice therefore must be made about which conception of 
nondiscrimination to pursue. The computer science literature, while 
helpful in defining the range of possible conceptions of algorithmic 
nondiscrimination, is less helpful in evaluating and ranking those 
definitions. 
2. The Irrelevance of False Positive Rates.  Two of the four 
definitions of algorithmic nondiscrimination developed above—
equally precise coercion and predictive error equality—focus on the 
rate of false positives. These two definitions differ, however, in terms 
of their denominator, which is alternatively (1) being coerced, or (2) 
being a nonrecidivist. False-positive focused definitions not only 
played a central role in the debate between Northpointe and 
ProPublica,339 they have also infiltrated public debate more broadly.340 
A concern with false positives is not without normative appeal. But 
definitions of nondiscrimination that hinge on false positive rates do 
not index in any obvious fashion the extent to which an algorithmic 
instrument exacerbates racial stratification. This section is hence 
directed at ruling out two of the four possible metrics of racial equity 
that have attracted the most public attention to date. 
For four interrelated reasons, the temptation to focus on false 
positives should be resisted. First, the criminal justice decisions subject 
to algorithmic resolution are all made in advance of potential adverse 
 
 336. See Angwin et al., supra note 16 (making this cricitism).  
 337. See supra note 20.  
 338. There are a number of computational fixes, which fall into the categories of pre-, in-, and 
post-processing. None are a complete fix. See Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice, supra note 
263, at 25–29.  
 339. See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 340. See Perfected in China, a Threat in the West, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2018, at 11 (“Some 
sentencing algorithms are more likely to label black defendants than white ones as being at high 
risk of reoffending.”). This reads as a concern with predictive error equality, although this is not 
wholly free from doubt.  
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actions. That is, a street stop is conducted by police, bail is denied by a 
judge, or a sentence is extended before the state knows, or can know, 
whether a suspect or defendant will in fact commit a criminal act. 
Officials using an algorithm, therefore, cannot know who is a true 
positive and who is a false positive among the pool of persons to the 
right of the vertical threshold illustrated in Figure 1. Even if we assume 
that an official responsible for applying the algorithm knows the 
general shape of the distribution (for example, as illustrated in Figure 
1), she does not and cannot know whether a particular suspect is in fact 
going to inflict harm; all she knows is how the algorithm has ranked 
that person. A test for nondiscrimination that distinguishes false 
positives from true positives implicitly helps itself to information that 
is not available to that official. And it is not at all clear why the failure 
to account for information that the official or algorithm cannot access 
should be treated as a failure. Provided that the decision rule otherwise 
achieves valued public goods at the lowest collateral cost, it is not clear 
why the (ordinarily unknown) distribution of false positives should 
matter. 
Second, the law in practice has a very high tolerance for false 
positives. In the policing and the pretrial detention contexts in 
particular, we are willing to tolerate a very high rate of false positives 
on the ground that the gains to crime suppression offset the costs of 
those false positives. Hence, in the policing context, a mere showing of 
“reasonable articulable suspicion,” which is far less than probable 
cause, is enough to warrant a street stop.341 In the bail context, the 
standard for detention under federal law is framed in terms of 
reasonableness and envisages substantial room for error.342 But 
disparities in the allocation of state-created goods (or harms) are 
generally thought to be worrisome if those goods are important. This 
explains the coverage of housing and employment opportunities by 
disparate impact regimes.343 Moreover, if the law takes the view that 
there is no reason for concern at the prospect of absolutely high levels 
 
 341. The initial delineation of rules for a street stop is contained in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
20–22 (1968). The phrase “reasonable, articulable suspicion” was used first in Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 51 (1979). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). 
 342. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012) (mandating pretrial detention unless the judge can impose 
conditions that “reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any 
other person and the community”); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Since the 
function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon 
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”).  
 343. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2525 (2015) (affirming that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act). 
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of stops or pretrial bail detentions, it is not clear that the law contains 
the normative resources to establish concern when those resources are 
allocated in subtly disparate ways—especially if the overall pattern of 
stops redounds to the net benefit of both society and the subordinated 
group.344 
Third, a failure of equally precise coercion or of predictive error 
equality is a mathematical function of the use of a single threshold for 
risk for two racial groups with different risk distributions.345 Given that 
relationship, it is necessary to choose between unequal rates of false 
positives and different risk thresholds. Merely pointing to one form of 
inequality is question begging. If the risk threshold is set at the socially 
efficient level, moreover, such that it optimizes over immediate costs 
and benefits for blacks as well as whites,346 equalizing false positives 
risks the imposition of unnecessary costs on the minority group. 
Although not dispositive, it is worth noting that equal protection 
doctrine does not treat unavoidable disparities generated by the 
pursuit of a valid governmental interest as cause for concern.347 At least 
where the state has no other means of suppressing crime without a 
violation of equally precise coercion or of predictive error equality, it 
is not obvious why the ensuing disparities should be treated as fatally 
problematic. 
Finally, and most importantly, if one is concerned with the impact 
of algorithmic criminal justice on a stratified racial minority, there is no 
basis for focusing solely on false positives. The negative expressive 
effects and social harms imposed by criminal justice institutions upon 
African American communities are not merely triggered by false 
positives. Directing coercion toward black suspects and defendants 
even when such coercion is warranted can have an expressive effect on 
public beliefs about black criminality and more material debilitating 
effects on communities, families, and children. Indeed, there is no 
particular reason to believe that any of these spillover costs are less if 
the person subject to the coercion is in fact a true rather than false 
positive. Put another way, if one cares about racial stratification, what 
 
 344. Note that the mere fact of a violation of equally precise coercion or predictive error 
equality is not evidence that the net effect of a criminal justice measure is to exacerbate overall 
racial disparities. There is no empirical equivalence between these terms.  
 345. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 309, at 799–802.  
 346. Id.; see supra note 318 and accompanying text.  
 347. For a discussion of the current doctrinal position of this element of disparate impact law, 
see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal 
Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1140 (2016). 
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should matter is the absolute cost of using a coercive tactic against a 
member of a minority group, net of benefit, for all members of that 
racial group—whether or not they ultimately would have acted in ways 
that justified coercion. Both kinds of actions have costs; both count for 
the purposes of racial equity. True, those costs are offset when an 
algorithm makes a correct prediction, but that is captured better by a 
focus on the benefits of the coercive measure being allocated.348 
For these four reasons, I do not think that either equally precise 
coercion or predictive error equality provides an appropriate metric 
for thinking about racial equality in this context. Rather, it is desirable 
in the end to know whether crime control is inflicting more costs than 
benefits for the minority group as a whole—and not just those who 
would otherwise not go on to inflict any social harm. 
3. Evaluating the Impact of Algorithmic Criminal Justice on Racial 
Stratification.  So what does matter? The opening two movements of 
this Part mapped the effect of criminal justice institutions on racial 
stratification and charted a general principle of racial equity. Existing 
criminal justice systems influence the extent of racialized social 
stratification in society as a whole.349 Racial equity in criminal justice 
generally—and in particular in the algorithmic context—should be 
primarily concerned with mitigating these pernicious effects. It should 
repudiate the tight linkages that have bound criminal justice to the 
reproduction of racial hierarchy since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Even if the present-day operation of criminal justice 
institutions cannot undo past harms, at a minimum they should not 
compound those harms. 
The question therefore is which of the available technical 
benchmarks best captures this pathway between criminal justice and 
racial stratification. As intimated already, I think that an appropriate 
benchmark would home in upon the net cost (or benefit) of an 
algorithmic criminal justice instrument for the racial minority in the 
socially subordinate position. A measure of costs net of benefits for the 
racial minority is relevant morally because it captures the extent to 
which a criminal justice measure depresses the social standing of an 
 
 348. I can imagine one more reason for taking normative account of false positives only: One 
might posit that the ratio of false positives to true positives is a measure of intragroup transfers. 
The greater the proportion of false positives, that is, the more the burden of crime suppression 
falls on those members of the minority who are nonrecidivists. This may be a morally relevant 
quality, but I am not convinced it is a measure of racial equity.  
 349. See supra Part III.A. 
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already marginalized minority group. In the context of black-white 
comparisons in America at least, this analysis is simplified by the fact 
that much violent crime is intraracial. That is, the benefits of a crime 
suppression measure imposed on blacks are likely to accrue largely to 
blacks (while the same is true for whites). The analysis would be more 
complex if we assumed that the racial minority did not capture all or 
most of the benefits of crime suppression targeting members of that 
minority. 
In my view, there is no one metric developed in the computer 
science literature or otherwise that captures this concern with racial 
stratification. Benchmarks that concern the rate of false positives 
capture in a very loose and partial way the magnitude of unjustified 
state coercion. But they fail to acknowledge the state’s inability to 
distinguish justified from unjustified exercises of coercion ex ante. 
Statistical parity does account for the aggregate cost of coercion on a 
racial minority. But it does so only through a comparative lens; it asks 
whether the minority is burdened more or less than a majority group. 
It also fails to consider offsetting benefits for the minority group. 
Because most crime is intraracial, it fails to account for the possibility 
that the benefits of crime suppression for blacks outweigh its costs. A 
comparative measure such as statistical parity is at best considered an 
evidentiary tool, therefore, rather than a direct measure of racial 
equity. 
An inquiry into racial equity can usefully focus instead on whether 
the marginal decision to impose coercion within the black population 
can be justified. I present first a simple version of this inquiry that 
assumes that all costs and benefits are immediate and that there are no 
spillovers. Consider again Figure 1. Imagine sliding the threshold for 
coercion for the minority population right, away from the y-axis. At 
first, the threshold would assign coercion to many people for whom the 
immediate costs of such coercion outweigh any benefits for the simple 
reason that their risk of causing harm is so low. At some point in the 
rightward movement of the threshold, however, the immediate costs of 
coercion would be balanced by its benefits. When the costs of this 
marginal decision to coerce are outweighed by its benefits, the 
threshold has been calibrated such that no net burden is being placed 
on the minority population, and all coercion generates a net gain for 
that group. Assuming that most relevant crime is intraracial, this means 
that the marginal benefits of coercion (for the black community) are 
greater than the costs of coercion (for the black community). Such a 
policy leaves that racial group no worse off than it would otherwise be. 
HUQ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:10 PM 
1130  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1043 
For interventions that prevent serious crimes, there is no reason 
to think that the immediate costs of coercion, or the immediate benefits 
of crime control, vary between racial groups. Moreover, spillovers can 
be ignored because such costs are likely to be rounding errors in 
relation to the costs of murder, sexual assault, armed robbery, and the 
like. Such a tightly focused analysis might, for example, be appropriate 
in the analysis of bail decisions where a suspect may go on to commit a 
serious violent crime. Under these conditions, a single risk threshold 
calibrated to be socially optimal (in the sense of eliminating cost-
unjustified coercion) will satisfy racial equity. It will also be socially 
efficient. 
This goal has likely not been reached in practice. Even assuming 
that criminal justice decision-makers are applying a single threshold 
rule (rather than being influenced by animus or racial stereotypes), it 
is very likely that many present uses of police coercion and detention 
are unjustified. The benefits of state coercion are likely overestimated, 
while its costs are underestimated. Consistent with this prediction, 
current risk assessment tools estimate the benefits of coercion but do 
not measure costs.350 Still, the present lack of empirical data on the 
costs and benefits of many familiar criminal justice institutions, such as 
street stops and bail denials, means that this intuition is hard to 
substantiate. But the available data suggests an excess of coercion 
beyond the socially optimal.351 When the supernumerary costs of such 
coercion fall on racial minorities, they intensify racial stratification. 
Ratcheting back the sheer volume of coercion, therefore, may be a 
first-order task in reform projects that have racial equity in mind. 
This simple analysis of racial equity accounts only for the 
immediate costs and benefits of coercion. It does not account for the 
externalities set forth in Part III.A. A more complex model of racial 
equity would account for all negative spillovers from algorithmically 
allocated coercion. These externalities are substantially greater for 
racial minorities than for the racial majority. They are also nontrivial 
in scale. Where less serious crime is concerned (e.g., public order 
offenses), it is likely that these externalities are of the same magnitude 
as the immediate benefits and costs of crime control. Second-order, 
 
 350. See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 584–86.  
 351. See Huq, Disparate Policing, supra note 5, at 2413–29; Note, Bail Reform and Risk 
Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127–28 (2018) 
(“The pretrial imprisonment rate in the United States is among the highest in the world—more 
than four times the world’s median pretrial imprisonment rate.”); see also Mayson, supra note 
126, at 545–48 (explaining costs and benefits of bail in a way that clarifies its complexity).  
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downstream costs of coercion therefore cannot be safely ignored as 
rounding errors in an analysis of the criminal justice system’s dynamic 
effects. The analysis for less serious crime, or for interventions that do 
not impede serious harms, is hence different from the analysis when 
serious social harm is directly at stake. 
Accounting for the racially asymmetrical distribution of 
externalities alters the racial equity analysis. It means that the marginal 
costs of coercion are likely to be greater for the racial minority. 
Accordingly, the point on the x-axis at which costs are equal to benefits 
for the minority is to the right of the same break-even point for the 
majority group. That is, because the operation of criminal justice 
coercion generates asymmetrical harms to black families and black 
communities, and exacerbates Kennedy’s racial tax, there will be a 
class of crimes for which a greater benefit will be required to achieve 
net positive effects for black suspects. And because the costs and 
benefits of crime are largely intraracial, the same higher risk threshold 
will be required to achieve social efficacy. Whether the focus is social 
efficiency or racial equity, this implies that the risk threshold for blacks 
should be set at a higher level (i.e., farther to the right in Figure 1) than 
the threshold for whites. Therefore, accounting for both the immediate 
and spillover costs of crime control when its immediate benefits are 
small conduces to a bifurcated risk threshold—one rule for the 
majority, and one for minority. The single vertical line in Figure 1 
would bifurcate. The line for blacks would move rightward. 
This is akin to common affirmative action schemes, in which 
otherwise similar black and white persons are treated differently 
because of the different spillover consequences of their treatment. In 
the affirmative action context, the existence of a positive diversity 
benefit (which is another kind of spillover) warrants a less stringent 
threshold rule for assigning a benefit to the racial minority.352 In the 
criminal justice context, similarly, the existence of negative spillovers 
for black families and communities warrants a more stringent risk 
threshold for the racial minority. The argument for a bifurcated 
classification rule is arguably stronger here than the argument for 
affirmative action: The alleviation of racial stratification, in my view, is 
a more acute interest than diversity because it directly benefits the 
most marginalized (which affirmative action may not) and immediately 
relieves stigmatic and material harms. Alleviating the effect of 
accumulated disadvantage caused by the historical operation of 
 
 352. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016). 
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criminal justice institutions, in other words, is a more compelling goal 
than crafting a well-rounded university population. 
Potentially unlike affirmative action, however, the case for 
multiple risk thresholds can be made independently on either racial 
equity or pure social efficiency grounds. So long as a policy’s costs (or 
its benefits) are largely internalized by racial groups, and so long as 
costs are greater at the margin for the minority group, a socially 
optimal rule would require different risk thresholds. Where the state 
adopts a cost-benefit approach to criminal justice policy,353 an exacting 
approach to cost-benefit trade-offs in crime control may in some cases 
generate dual thresholds.354 In the algorithmic context, it is worth 
noting that a machine-learning tool, given the necessary data and asked 
to vindicate social efficiency (understood in a capacious sense that 
reached both static and dynamic effects), could converge on a 
bifurcated rule absent race-conscious human decision-making. 
However that goal is approached, its achievement imposes large 
new epistemic burdens on the state. Whereas risk assessment in 
criminal justice to date has focused narrowly on the costs of crime, a 
rigorously executed algorithmic method demands data on the costs of 
crime control. This is a matter not merely of counting state 
expenditures but also of measuring spillovers. This is a massive task. 
But its size and difficulty ought not to be a justification for avoidance. 
The current dearth of information about the spillover costs of criminal 
justice institutions, particularly for minority communities, is causally 
related to their stratifying effects. Ignorance of spillovers, coupled to a 
myopic focus on a small number of high-profile crimes, creates the 
epistemic background against which actually existing state institutions 
compound racial stratification. That ignorance is thus a form of 
“hermeneutical injustice,” in which “some significant area of one’s 
social experience [is] obscured from collective understanding owing to 
persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalization.”355 Racial 
inequity cannot be justified by hermeneutic injustice. Precisely how the 
epistemic gap will be closed is a large question, and I do not take it up 
 
 353. A version of cost-benefit analysis is endorsed in Barry Friedman & Maria 
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1907 (2015) (encouraging even 
“small steps” in that direction).  
 354. It is also possible that a jurisdiction could pursue social efficiency by deploying a 
nonracial bifurcation in the risk threshold. For instance, it may in some instances be possible to 
employ socioeconomic stratification to much the same end.  
 355. MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 154 
(2007) (emphasis omitted).  
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here. But it is worth noting that the algorithmic tools mapped here may 
have a role. Determining how big-data tools can contribute to this 
epistemic enterprise, indeed, is perhaps the next technological frontier 
in criminal justice. 
At the same time, a multiple threshold rule for different racial 
groups runs headlong into the anticlassification rule of equal protection 
doctrine.356 At a minimum, it would receive strict scrutiny.357 As a 
result, a multiple threshold regime would be in serious constitutional 
jeopardy. Under these conditions, which are hardly empirically 
implausible, the regime imperiled by our constitutional equality 
doctrine is the only one that both mitigates racial stratification and also 
maximizes social welfare. Why would we want to place that regime 
beyond reach? I can think of no good answer. Such a result, in my view, 
tells us more about our wrongheaded racial equality doctrine than it 
does about the substance of algorithmic criminal justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Algorithmic criminal justice, relying first on machine learning and 
then on deep learning, is only now beginning to impinge on criminal 
justice institutions. For a much longer time, the latter have been sites 
for the production of racial stratification. This comes in the form of a 
policing and carceral apparatus that weighs most heavily on African 
Americans. It also arises thanks to a racial tax that extends to all 
members of the group, whether or not they have any connection to 
criminality. 
Given this history, it seems to me important to get algorithmic 
criminal justice right. Such tools, if fashioned wisely, might be useful in 
restoring equilibrium and mitigating the burden of racial externalities. 
Wrongly configured, they may prove subtle levers for preserving or 
even exacerbating those burdens. Wrongly configured, I also fear, they 
would be exceedingly hard to dislodge. My aim in this Article has been 
to demonstrate that constitutional law does not contain effectual tools 
to meet these problems. It is a mistake, therefore, to contort 
constitutional doctrine in the hope that it will do service in a context 
where it is so substantially ill fitted. Far better, in my view, to recognize 
that the constitutional law of racial equality has almost nothing cogent 
to say about what counts as a racially just algorithm. It might instead 
 
 356. See supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. 
 357. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
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achieve the remarkable doubleheader of impeding both racial equity 
and social welfare maximization. The doctrine is thus a moral vacuity. 
Reformulation of the doctrine, in my view, is desirable but 
unlikely. In the interim, algorithm designers, local officials, and state 
legislators should instead ask directly how best to achieve racial equity 
given the shape of existing criminal justice institutions and the 
technical tools at their disposal. I have offered an answer to that 
question that draws on, without quite tracking, existing technical 
definitions of algorithmic nondiscrimination. I have further stressed 
that my approach has the distinctive feature of aligning racial equity 
with social efficiency. My project has been demarcated in terms of 
algorithmic criminal justice. But it should not escape notice that there 
is no particular reason to confine the scope of the analysis to 
algorithmic tools, or even to criminal justice. But those extensions are 
for another day. For now, a recognition of the potential convergence 
of equity and efficiency might move us closer to a remedy for the 
difficult, enduring, and damaging legacy of our racialized criminal 
justice past. 
